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ABSTRACT
Judicial discretion plays an important role in the sentencing process. Unrestrained
discretion has the potential to lead to unwarranted disparity in sentencing outcomes. In
an effort to constrain some of that discretion, the Federal Sentence Guidelines were
implemented in 1987 so that judges were to consider just an offender’s criminal history
and the severity of the offense when determining sentences. In the 2005 Supreme Court
case United States v. Booker, these guidelines were ruled unconstitutional and in
violation of the 6th Amendment. This dissertation examines sentencing outcomes in the
wake of this landmark decision. Using data from the U.S. Sentencing Commission, this
dissertation examines the ways that extra-legal characteristics (e.g., race/ethnicity,
gender, and age) may influence sentencing outcomes net of legally-relevant
characteristics (criminal history and offense severity) both before and after the Booker
decision. Moreover, this dissertation also examines the extent to which social context
(e.g., political climate, community characteristics, and administrative variables) may
influence sentencing outcomes. Finally, it examines how both individual-level and
aggregate-level characteristics may interact to influence sentencing outcomes. Results
indicate that the majority of the “action” occurs at the individual level, however,
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aggregate-level characteristics contextualize the individual-level in important ways.
Implications are discussed.

vi

Table of Contents
Chapter 1: INTRODUCTION............................................................................................. 1
Chapter 2: SENTENCING DISPARITY .......................................................................... 16
Judicial Discretion and Determinate Sentencing .......................................................... 16
The Development of Federal Sentencing Guidelines .................................................... 18
Booker & Sentencing Outcomes ................................................................................... 23
Focal Concerns .............................................................................................................. 29
Race/Ethnicity & Federal Sentencing ........................................................................... 33
Race/Ethnicity & Sentencing Policy ......................................................................... 36
Gender and Sentencing.................................................................................................. 37
Gender & Sentencing Policy ..................................................................................... 40
Age & Sentencing ......................................................................................................... 41
Age & Sentencing Policy .......................................................................................... 42
The Intersections of Race/Ethnicity, Gender & Age..................................................... 43
Intersectionality & Sentencing Policy ....................................................................... 45
Chapter 3: SOCIAL CONTEXT AND SENTENCING ................................................... 47
Political Climate ............................................................................................................ 48
Racial & Ethnic Threat .................................................................................................. 50
Female Labor Force Participation ................................................................................. 56
Courtroom Communities & Administrative Factors ..................................................... 57
Cross-Level Interactions ............................................................................................... 59
Chapter 4: DATA AND METHODS ................................................................................ 62
Dependent Variable ....................................................................................................... 63
Independent Variables ................................................................................................... 64
Legal Variables ............................................................................................................. 64
Extra-Legal Variables ................................................................................................... 65
Social Context Variables ............................................................................................... 66
Analytic Strategy ........................................................................................................... 67
Chapter 5: RACE/ETHNICITY, SEX, AND AGE RESULTS ........................................ 71
Discussion of Results .................................................................................................... 74
Chapter 6: SOCIAL CONTEXT RESULTS .................................................................... 77
vii

Discussion of Results .................................................................................................... 80
Chapter 7: CROSS-LEVEL INTERACTION RESULTS ................................................ 82
Discussion of Results .................................................................................................... 86
Chapter 8: CONCLUSION ............................................................................................... 89
REFERENCES ................................................................................................................. 96
TABLES ......................................................................................................................... 107
FIGURES ........................................................................................................................ 124

viii

Chapter 1: INTRODUCTION
The focal concerns and causal attribution perspectives (Albonetti, 1991; Harris,
2007; Steffensmeier et al., 1993) suggest that judges sentence criminal offenders based
on three criteria: blameworthiness, protection to the community, and practical constraints
and consequences. Judges rarely, however, have complete information on these criteria,
so instead they take steps to reduce uncertainty. They do this by using perceptual
shorthands, which link these focal concerns to offender-level characteristics, such as
race/ethnicity, gender, and age. These shorthands are often based on judges’ own
perceptions, stereotypes, and biases, but are also influenced by local context. Building on
this perspective, Kramer & Ulmer (2009) later developed a more comprehensive theory
of focal concerns that incorporates community context more explicitly. They argue that
societal attitudes, along with local correctional policies and resources act as a filter for
focal concerns and, in turn, influence sentencing outcomes. Sentencing research, then,
needs to account for these aggregate-level considerations as well as individual-level
characteristics to more fully explain variation in sentencing outcomes. They find support
for key aspects of their model using state-level data from Pennsylvania. Here I explore
the degree to which their theoretical perspective can also apply to the Federal system. I
also extend their work by examining how intersectionality, policy, and community
context influence Federal sentencing outcomes.
Kramer & Ulmer’s model suggests that focal concerns should play a more
significant role in sentencing systems where guidelines and other policies are less
stringent. Thus, the United States v. Booker decision provides an optimal time frame
around which to test this framework at the Federal level. The Booker decision essentially
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ruled that the Federal guidelines were in violation of the 6th Amendment and must be
considered advisory rather than mandatory. This decision provides the opportunity to
examine sentencing disparity from both a contextual lens (e.g., extra-legal variables at
both the individual and aggregate levels) but also across types of sentencing systems
(e.g., mandatory guidelines vs. advisory guidelines).
Researchers generally approach judicial discretion from the focal concerns
perspective (Steffensmeier et. al, 1993; 1998). The perspective suggests that when
judges sentence offenders, they take three characteristics into account: blameworthiness,
protection of the community, and practical constraints and consequences.
Blameworthiness generally refers to the level of accountability or culpability attributed to
the offender. Protection of the community relates to how likely the offender is to
recidivate. Finally, practical constraints can capture a lot of things, from administrative
variables such as caseloads and courtroom workgroup relationships, to concerns about
prison space, the health of the offender, and family ties left behind. According to this
perspective, judges consider these criteria and use them to guide sentencing decisions.
Numerous scholars have used the focal concerns perspective to examine sentencing
outcomes and disparities (Demuth & Steffensmeier, 2004; Steffensmeier & Demuth,
2006; Steffensmeier et al., 1993; Steffensmeier et al., 1998).
The focal concerns perspective is also linked to the uncertainty avoidance and
causal attribution models (see Albonetti, 1991; Harris, 2007). Judges use status
characteristics in conjunction with legal criteria, such as offense severity and criminal
history. While judges try to use focal concerns to guide sentencing decisions, the
information that they have is generally not complete enough to make accurate evaluations

2

of blameworthiness, community protection, and practical constraints. In order to reduce
this uncertainty, judges rely on patterned responses, or perceptual shorthands (Albonetti,
1991; Steffensmeier et al., 1998), which relate to things that judges know about, such as
characteristics of the offender, (e.g., race/ethnicity, gender, and age).
To the extent that judges rely on extra-legal characteristics (e.g., race/ethnicity,
gender, and age) to reach sentencing decisions, the issues of fairness, uniformity, and
consistency come into question. These concerns were among the reasons for the
implementation of the Federal Guidelines in the first place (Tonry, 1996).
Though these perspectives present extra-legal considerations as though judges
apply them in a straightforward way, each with its own independent contribution to the
sentencing decision, in practice, judges’ application of extra-legal variables is not likely
straight-forward. A number of studies have suggested that extra-legal variables are not
independent (Doerner & Demuth, 2010; Steffensmeier et al., 1993; 1998). That is, it is
not enough to simply look at race/ethnicity, gender, and age in isolation. These
characteristics do not act additively – they act multiplicatively (McCall, 2005). Put
simply, the level of identifiable disparity in sentencing outcomes may vary across not just
through race/ethnicity, gender, and age, but across the intersections of these
characteristics. For example, disparity in sentencing may look different depending on
whether researchers look at white women, black women, Hispanic women, young
Hispanic men, older white women, and so on (also see Franklin, 2013a; Franklin, 2013b;
Freiburger & Hilinski, 2013; Pasko, 2002). While there is no shortage of research on
disparity in sentencing outcomes, the extent to which studies have examined the joint
roles of extra-legal characteristics and policy is much narrower. I intended to fill this gap
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by incorporating an intersectional perspective (e.g., race/ethnicity, gender, and age) in the
context of varying sentencing systems (mandatory and advisory guidelines).
Individual-level characteristics, such as those described above, are unlikely to be
the only extra-legal factors that influence judicial discretion. Social context may also
influence judicial discretion. These social context variables often appear at the
aggregate-level and they might include things that judges don’t actively think about, but
that still affect the decision making process (although, some of them might be a little
more explicit), such as local political climate, community characteristics, or even
administrative variables. All of these contextual factors are linked to the practical
constraints and consequences that Steffensmeier et al. (1993; 1998) discuss. Civic
participation, racial and ethnic composition, labor force participation, and caseloads
might all influence the way that judges make decisions about sentencing.
Perhaps most importantly, it seems reasonable that the individual-level extra-legal
factors discussed earlier, and the contextual variables described above may interact.
More specifically, in certain contextual environments, individual-level variables such as
race/ethnicity may play a greater role in sentencing outcomes than they would in other
contextual situations. For example, political climates could potentially condition
individual-level factors, making them more or less important to sentencing decisions
(Jacobs & Jackson, 2010; Helms & Costanza, 2010; Helms & Jacobs, 2002). Still, it
seems most likely that individual-level factors pack the most “punch”, at least as far as
extra-legal variables go (Ulmer & Johnson, 2004). After all, sentences are handed down
to individuals, not communities, so characteristics of the individual should naturally take
on more importance.
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In their examination of Pennsylvania State Sentencing Guidelines, Kramer and
Ulmer (2009) propose a theoretical model that integrates these individual-level factors
(e.g., focal concerns) with larger scale phenomena to explain sentencing decisions. They
argue that societal factors, such as the politics surrounding criminal justice, and societallevel stratification influence responses to crime at more localized levels, such as state and
county-levels. This relationship likely manifests through attitudes toward crime control
and/or due process, and how punitive society generally is. Specifically, one might expect
that where social inequality is greatest, so too will responses to crime take a more
punitive form. These attitudes are filtered by localized politics and correctional
resources. While less relevant to Federal level sentencing, correctional politics (e.g.,
Guidelines) and resources (e.g., caseloads and prison space) are certainly impactful.
When courts are over-burdened with cases, and prisons do not have enough space for
new (or returning) prisoners, the courts need to find ways to address these problems,
which may influence whether and how they use status characteristics to assess
blameworthiness or danger. Thus, policies, attitudes, and resources combine to influence
decision-making. For instance, where resources are constrained, plea negotiations may
become particularly appealing to lawyers and judges. They can (but not always) result in
more lenient sentences for offenders who participate in them. Under conditions where
resources are limited, focal concerns, which often reflect individual-level factors, but
sometimes administrative or contextual factors as well, can play an especially important
role. Judges may take focal concerns into consideration to reach sentencing decisions, as
this helps relieve some of the strain of resource shortfall by allowing judges to work
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through caseloads more quickly. These focal concerns may influence plea negotiates,
which is one way to do that.
To put it more succinctly, Kramer and Ulmer (2009) present six propositions in
their analysis of the Pennsylvania State System. They suggest that, first, sentencing
outcomes, which include both sentencing severity and use of guidelines (e.g., departures),
are likely to vary across community context. Second, these decisions are framed by
assessments of defenders’ blameworthiness, community protection needs, and practical
constraints and consequences (or, focal concerns). Third, these focal concerns are often
influenced by policy structures and attitudes, stereotypes, and biases. Fourth, the
influence of social status characteristics (e.g., race/ethnicity, gender, age) is conditional
and varies across combinations of characteristics. Fifth, the interpretation of focal
concerns is influenced by the combination of culture, politics, and resources. Finally, and
perhaps most importantly, the less that guidelines (or other policy initiatives) restrict
discretion, the more focal concerns and perceptual shorthands can influence sentencing
outcomes, sometimes resulting in unwarranted disparity (Kramer & Ulmer, 2009: 5-11).
While this theoretical model was applied at the state-level, it does not seem
implausible that it would also apply at the Federal-level. Federal-level sentencing is
susceptible to judicial discretion in the same way that state-level sentencing is. While the
shape and nature of focal concerns may differ between the Federal- and state-levels, they
most likely affect sentencing outcomes at each level, and they are influenced by some of
the same (or at least similar) structural and contextual factors.
A final issue, and one that Kramer and Ulmer (2009) integrate into their
theoretical model, is policy. Policy can take many forms, including but not limited to
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Sentencing Guidelines systems. Many of the states, including Pennsylvania, as well as
the Federal System were governed by such a Guidelines system for a number of years.
Prior to the 1980s, Federal judges responsible for sentencing criminal offenders
had relatively unrestricted discretion available to them. They could freely decide not
only whether offenders should be incarcerated, but also for how long they should be
incarcerated. This represented an indeterminate sentencing system. In the 1980s,
conservatives and liberals alike criticized the large amount of discretion available to
judges, and in 1984, the Sentencing Reform Act was passed, placing constraints on
judicial discretion. In 1987, Congress implemented the Federal Sentencing Guidelines,
which altered sentencing so that judges were to account for only an offender’s criminal
history and the severity of the offense to determine a narrow range within which the
offender could be sentenced. This shift represented the introduction of a determinate
sentencing system at the Federal level.
In the 2005 United States v. Booker case, the Supreme Court ruled these Federal
Guidelines unconstitutional, in violation of the 6th Amendment. This ruling, in effect,
made the Federal Guidelines advisory rather than mandatory, potentially signaling a shift
back toward indeterminate sentencing. I see this decision as a research opportunity to
examine judicial discretion, and more importantly, the effect of policy and practice on
sentencing outcomes. Moreover, Booker provides an opportunity to compare the
influences of extra-legal variables on sentencing outcomes, before and after the decision.
In some ways, Booker provides an opportunity for a “natural experiment” (Hofer, 2007).
The Booker decision introduced a number of empirical questions related to
sentencing structures and outcomes. Key among them is the question of the effect
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Booker would have on final sentencing outcomes. The Guidelines led to longer, more
severe sentences (Tonry, 1996). Would Booker result in shorter, more lenient sentences,
would it lead to even harsher sentences than under the determinate Guidelines system, or
would it have no effect at all? Following Booker judges still had to calculate the sentence
that the Guidelines would suggest, but they had more freedom to depart from those
guidelines; however, if they did, the sentence would be subject to appellate review.
Under post-Booker sentencing policies, it is possible for judges to consider a broad range
of mitigating and aggravating circumstances and to sentence more leniently or harshly
than the Guidelines advise. However, judges might try to avoid appellate review by
continuing to sentence within the Guidelines, thereby rendering the changes brought on
by Booker inconsequential.
Since Booker, a number of empirical studies have examined changes in Federal
Sentencing outcomes (Hofer, 2007; Ulmer et al., 2011a; Ulmer et al., 2011b). Generally,
these studies have focused on rather broad trends. For example, how much has the rate of
departing from the guidelines changed post-Booker (Hofer, 2007)? Have there been
changes to inter-district variation in sentencing practices post-Booker (Ulmer et al.,
2011a)? Have levels of racial disparity in sentencing outcomes changed since the
decision (Ulmer et al., 2011b)? Little is known about the more nuanced effects of extralegal characteristics in the post-Booker era. For example, how do extra-legal
characteristics such as race/ethnicity, gender, and age interact to influence sentencing
outcomes before and after Booker? What role does social context (e.g., aggregate-level
racial/ethnicity composition, levels of social disadvantage, and other practical constraints
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and consequences such as administrative characteristics like caseload) play in sentencing
outcomes, and how has it changed since the Booker decision?
These questions suggest that it may be insufficient to simply evaluate the effects
of Booker in a general sense, since the effects may be indirect or conditional. For
instance, Booker may have affected judicial decision making differently for offenders of
different racial and ethnic groups. This is because with more discretion, judges have
more flexibility to consider extra-legal factors such as blameworthiness, protection of the
community, and practical constraints, which are often inferred through perceptual shorthands (see Steffensmeier, 1993; 1998). Thus, it is important to evaluate the impact of
Booker across different groups of offenders. Not only are race and ethnicity important
contingencies to examine, but so are gender and age since these also introduce a range of
extra-legal considerations. For instance, did Booker have a differential effect across male
and female offenders, or were the effects consistent? This is also not clear simply by
looking at Booker in a strictly general sense.
Yet another line of empirical questioning centers around issues of social context.
In the post-Booker era, would social context, such as political climate, levels of socioeconomic disadvantage, and administrative and organizational-level factors influence
sentencing outcomes more than they did in the pre-Booker period? It seems likely that
once the constraints on judicial discretion were removed, or at the very least changed,
that judges would begin taking mitigating factors into account that they could not in the
past. Perhaps most importantly, would the extra-legal variables discussed above, which
tap into Steffensmeier et al.’s (1993; 1998) focal concerns, interact with some of the
contextual variables described above? Under such conditions, the influence of
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race/ethnicity, gender, and age could vary depending on the nature of social context (e.g.,
political climate, racial/ethnicity composition, and so on). Thus, Booker provides an
opportunity to examine a plethora of questions that have not been investigated in ways
that have not been possible in the past.
Clearly, the Booker decision has left sentencing researchers with many
unanswered questions, some general, and some nuanced. In this dissertation, I aim to
shed light on some of these unanswered questions. In a broad sense, my research is
guided by the following research question: What impact, if any, did the Booker decision
have on Federal sentencing outcomes? One the one hand, perhaps judges used their
expanded discretion to sentence offenders more punitively. On the other hand, judges
may have used their discretion to account for circumstances surrounding offenses,
sentencing more leniently, and focusing more on rehabilitation than retribution,
incapacitation, and deterrence.
Importantly, I also intend to address the more nuanced questions. Did the Booker
effect differ depending on the racial and ethnic backgrounds of offenders? Did its effect
vary across gender? Did it vary across age? Did it vary across social context? These are
all relatively unexplored questions that I intend to tackle in this research. Broadly, I
argue that following Booker, judges had more discretion at their disposal, allowing them
more flexibility to individualize sentences. That is, they were better able to take practical
constraints, such as family circumstances under consideration and to mete out the
appropriate sentences. In some cases, this might lead to harsher sentencing and in others
to more lenient sentencing than would have been the case under mandatory guidelines.
Moreover, how Booker affected sentencing outcomes likely varies across some of the
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contingencies discussed above. Specifically, by examining these contingencies closely,
researchers and policymakers both can understand the specific impact that policy
decisions have on sentencing outcomes, which has consequences for uniformity and
consistency in sentencing.
My research contributes to the literature on sentencing decisions and Booker in
three key ways. First, I examine the non-independence of extra-legal variables, such as
race/ethnicity, gender, and age. By modeling each of these characteristics as
independent, research is likely to present an incomplete understanding of the way that
these factors operate in practice. By looking closely at the intersections of these
variables, this research can test for variation across groups that are masked in research
that focuses solely on main effects. While previous research has examined these
intersections (see Doerner & Demuth, 2004; Steffensmeier et al., 1993; 1998), my
research will also integrate the role of policy, and examine how the influence of these
extra-legal characteristics change across time period. This potential variation across time
and sentencing structure will link back to the focal concerns and uncertainty avoidance
perspectives. Most likely, judges will have more flexibility to use perceptual shorthands
to reduce uncertainty when they have more discretion at their disposal, which is likely
characteristic of the post-Booker era.
Second, this research examines the role of social context on sentencing outcomes,
again through the focal concerns and uncertainty avoidance perspectives. Using Kramer
and Ulmer’s (2009) theoretical framework from the Pennsylvania State Sentencing
Guidelines system as a roadmap, I examine how aggregate-level social variables
penetrate the judicial decision-making nexus. While Kramer and Ulmer examined the
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role of social variables at the county-level, I do so at the Federal district-level, which
introduces both challenges and opportunities. In doing so, I examine how aggregate-level
factors, such as political climate, racial composition, disadvantage, and administrative
courtroom variables influence judicial decision-making through focal concerns. In this
way, I assess whether and how the use of perceptual shorthands to reduce uncertainty
varies across social context. The notion that social context can affect individual-level
decisions is an important one, which research examining Federal sentencing outcomes
has not fully addressed.
Finally, this research speaks to the often neglected role of policy and practice in
the use of both individual-level extra-legal characteristics and social context in reaching
sentencing decisions. Policy can often act as a filter for discretion in the criminal justice
system, often displacing it from one actor to another (Engen et al., 2003). Thus, the
changing nature of policy can have important implications for the use of discretion in
sentencing. In this case, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines were designed to constrain
judicial discretion. In the post-Booker era, where the Guidelines were made advisory
rather than mandatory, discretion is likely to take a different form. The stringency of
policy is something linked directly to discretion. In the world of advisory sentencing
guidelines, judges most likely have the freedom to integrate more focal concerns and
techniques for uncertainty avoidance into their decisions. However whether they actually
do so is an empirical question that I address in this dissertation.
This question is important because it highlights the role of discretion in the
criminal justice system (CJS). While the CJS holds an aura of legitimacy and objectivity,
there is no question that discretion guides a variety of justice decisions. It is important to
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know how that discretion works, what the consequences of that discretion are, and if
needed, the most appropriate ways to alter the amount and shape of discretion available
to decision makers. Moreover, one of the biggest concerns in the CJS is the amount of
racial disparity in it – after all, one of the goals of the Sentencing Reform Act was to
reduce the amount of disparity in the CJS, while simultaneously increasing the levels of
consistency, uniformity, and predictability in sentencing outcomes. The present research
is less interested in uniformity across sentencing districts (see Ulmer et al., 2011a; 2011b
for more on this). Instead the focus is explicitly on the role of extra-legal variables and
how both social context and policy can influence sentencing.
To reiterate, the central argument in this dissertation is that judges have more
flexibility to integrate perceptual shorthands and causal attributions into decision-making
when sentencing policies afford them more discretion. Specifically, in a system with
advisory guidelines, judges will have greater ability to use shorthands that attempt to
reduce levels of uncertainty about offenders’ blameworthiness, likelihood of recidivism,
and practical constraints and consequences. To more fully understand the nature of these
perceptual shorthands, I also investigate the conditional nature of extra-legal
characteristics, testing their interactive effects to illuminate how intersectionality frames
sentencing decisions. Additionally, I examine the role that aggregate-level social
variables play on these decisions through focal concerns and uncertainty avoidance,
suggesting that social context has more room to creep into sentencing-decisions in a
system less constrained by policy (e.g., Booker). Perhaps most importantly, I examine
the possibility of an effect where social context conditions the influence of extra-legal
demographic variables, such that individual characteristics will play a greater or lesser
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role on sentencing outcomes depending on social environments. Put simply, in the postBooker era, I expect to find greater use of judicial discretion to reduce uncertainty in
sentencing through the use of perceptual shorthands. Most likely, this results in certain
groups receiving sentences more punitive than others, particularly in the post-Booker era.
In the following chapters, I engage in a deep analysis of the history and
consequences of both the United States Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the United
States v. Booker (2005) decision on sentencing outcomes, focal concerns, and uncertainty
avoidance. In the next chapter I present a review of the literature on both the theoretical
perspectives, and the emergence and decline of the Federal Guidelines as well as how
extra-legal variables (both individual and social textual) affect sentencing outcomes. I
then present the data I use to test my arguments regarding judicial discretion, policy, and
sentencing outcomes by examining first the role of discretion and policy with respect to
the intersectional nature of extra-legal variables, followed by an analysis of the role of
social context on sentencing outcomes, and a final analysis where I examine the
interactions between the two. I then conclude this dissertation with a discussion about
the role of discretion and policy in sentencing, how those conclusions speak to focal
concerns, uncertainty avoidance, and sentencing more generally, and explore avenues for
future research.
By drawing attention to potential disparities in sentencing outcomes, the current
research may provide applications for adjusting policy to address those disparities.
Moreover, it is likely that the degree to which society favors crime control over due
process often manifests itself in correctional decisions, such as sentencing outcomes. If
the fairness and equity of those decisions is called into question, then the aura of
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legitimacy held by the criminal justice system may be jeopardized. In this way, the
current research also speaks to the role of discretion in the criminal justice system, and
whether and under what conditions it should be expanded, reduced, or redistributed.
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Chapter 2: SENTENCING DISPARITY
Judicial Discretion and Determinate Sentencing
Criminal sentencing is an integral part of the criminal justice system process.
Crimes need to carry appropriate punishments, but it is not always clear what those
punishments should be, or the factors that should shape punishment decisions. Should
punishments be based on solely legally-relevant variables, such as the offender’s criminal
history, and the offense that was committed? Or, should judges also account for the
various circumstances surrounding an offense? There is much debate around this issue,
and much of it centers on a single concept – judicial discretion, which refers to the
amount of decision-making flexibility available to judges in the sentencing stage.
When judges have more discretion at their disposal, they are able to consider a
multitude of factors, including legally-relevant criteria such as prior history of offending
and the gravity of the offense, but also other extra-legal factors, such as the offender’s
education level, employment status, family ties, income, citizenship status, race,
ethnicity, and gender. This level of discretion is generally linked to indeterminate
sentencing systems, where judges are relatively free to prescribe terms of sentences, but
parole boards ultimately decide when offenders can be released back into society.
In many contemporary sentencing systems, judicial discretion may be
constrained. In such systems, judges are not free to consider these extra-legal variables.
Instead, their focus is limited to very specific criteria, generally limited to offense
severity and criminal history. These types of constraints on discretion are linked to
determinate sentencing systems, where criminal sentences are determined by sentencing
rules and policies rather than the decision-making discretion of individual judges. The
purpose of determinate sentencing is to foster uniformity and consistency in sentencing.
16

Some argue, however, that this uniformity may compromise fairness and appropriate
sanctioning (Tonry, 1996).
Judges are not the only courtroom actors who use discretion in the sentencing
process. In some ways, prosecutorial discretion can be important as well. Prosecutors
make the final decision regarding criminal charges and related mitigators or aggravators
to the sentence. In a system where judges hold wide discretion (e.g., indeterminate
sentencing), prosecutorial discretion has a more limited influence on sentencing
outcomes. However, when judicial discretion is constrained, the impact of prosecutorial
decisions is magnified because judges have less room to mitigate the decisions made by
prosecutors (Bay, 2006). Thus, there is a finite degree of discretion in any sentencing
system such that when judges lose discretion, it does not simply disappear, but instead
shifts to prosecutors. If judicial discretion is expanded, then prosecutorial decisions do
not wield the same strength, and in some ways, they lose discretion. This is called the
hydraulic effect (see Engen et al., 2003).
Through the majority of the 20th century, federal judges operated under an
indeterminate sentencing system. In this system, characterized by judicial discretion,
judges were able to individualize sentencing to the characteristics of both the offense and
the offenders. As the 1970s and 1980s approached, the indeterminate system came under
fire on the grounds that the system was both too lenient (levied by conservatives) and the
liberal critique that it was unfair to racial minorities (see Garland, 2001; Pratt, 2008;
Tonry, 1996). These objections led to sentencing reform that coincided with the crime
control movement of the early 1980s. All of this ultimately resulted in the Sentencing
Reform Act of 1984, which attempted to introduce consistency, uniformity, and
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appropriate severity to federal sentencing with the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. The
Guidelines were a way to constrain judicial discretion by limiting judicial decision
making to two factors – offense severity and criminal history. By constraining judicial
power, discretion was shifted from judges to prosecutors, illustrating the hydraulic effect
(Engen et al., 2003).
At the federal level, sentencing decisions followed the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines through the 1990s and into the year 2000. By this time, however, the
Guidelines system became the target of several challenges. In the year 2005, the United
States v. Booker decision shifted the Guidelines from mandatory to advisory, after the
Supreme Court ruled them in violation of the 6th Amendment (see Hofer, 2007; Kramer,
2009). This represents a substantial change, with significant implications for federal
sentencing practices. The decision had the potential to shift discretion away from
prosecutors and back to judges, and ultimately began a shift back toward indeterminate
sentencing (Chiu, 2005). Under the post-Booker system, judges were to use the
guidelines as a starting point from which they could then individualize sentencing, and in
some cases, use extra-legal characteristics to guide their sentencing decisions.

The Development of Federal Sentencing Guidelines
The U.S. Federal Sentencing Guidelines were the result of a movement to reform
sentencing practices in the United States during the 1970s and 1980s. For the majority of
the 20th century, judges embraced a rehabilitative model of sentencing (see Garland,
2001; Pratt, 2008). According to this model, criminal offenders were in need of
treatment, and punishment should serve as an intervention, with rehabilitation as the
primary goal. Judges held tremendous discretion to craft a sentence that would best
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fulfill the rehabilitative goals of the criminal justice system. This reflected an
indeterminate sentencing system, because judges would use their discretion to inform the
defendant of his/her maximum sentence, and the parole board would ultimately decide
when the offender would be released. This model came under fire during the late 1960s,
early 1970s, and especially the 1980s. By this time, both liberals and conservatives had
lost faith in the indeterminate model. Conservatives argued that rehabilitation was
ineffective, and that punishments needed to be more severe. Liberals, on the other hand,
were fearful that the wide discretion afforded to judges resulted in disparate sentences,
particularly on racial and ethnic grounds. Thus, both groups called for more uniformity
and consistency to sentencing, while conservatives called for more severity.
The solution came in the form of the Sentencing Reform Act (1984) and the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, which took effect in 1987. These Guidelines were
designed to constrain judicial discretion. The Guidelines instructed judges to sentence
within a narrow range based on two factors: 1) the severity of offense and 2) the
offender’s criminal history. These two considerations would lead judges to a grid, and
judges could sentence within the range that corresponds with a particular cell on the grid.
Judges were not able to depart from those ranges except in rare circumstances, which
were subject to appellate review. Moreover, because sentencing was based on relevant
conduct1 rather than offense-of-conviction, judges were instructed to engage in factfinding exercises. If judges found that a preponderance of evidence suggested that
offenders committed crimes that were uncharged by prosecutors, they were to sentence
these offenders more severely. This was likely done to avoid charge bargaining and other

1

Relevant conduct refers to what a judge determines actually happened, rather than what offense the
defendant is charged with.
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mechanisms for circumventing the Guidelines (see Tonry, 1996). For example, if a judge
found that a defendant used a firearm in the commission of a crime, the judge was to raise
that defendant’s offense score. It is noteworthy that these adjustments were based on a
preponderance of evidence standard (e.g., more likely that it happened than it did not),
rather than the beyond a reasonable doubt standard that jury trials were subject to. While
the Guidelines effectively constrained judicial discretion, and shifted a lot of it from
judges to prosecutors, judges still held some discretion. The Guidelines represented a
new era in sentencing, and it appeared that they were here to stay.
This process spelled out in the Guidelines, however, raised some questions. Most
notably, should judges be able to take findings, other than those proved to a jury beyond a
reasonable doubt, or those admitted by a defendant, and apply them in the sentencing
stage? Previous cases have shown that there is a precedent for doing just that. In the
rehabilitative era, judges were responsible for crafting a sentence appropriate to the goal
of rehabilitating offenders. In doing so they often used information from outside of trial,
such as pre-sentence reports, or other facts gleaned from a preponderance of evidence
standard, to inform sentencing. This raised some challenges because according to the 6th
Amendment, defendants had a constitutional right to trial by jury. In order to be
convicted and punished for a crime, the facts must be presented to the jury, and the
defendant must be found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. However, during sentencing,
judges used facts not vetted in trial. This issue was first addressed in Williams v. New
York (1949), where the Supreme Court found that judges could indeed use extracourtroom information to influence sentencing. The issue was re-visited over 25 years
later when, in McMillan v. Pennsylvania (1986), a Pennsylvania judge used the
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preponderance of evidence standard to apply a mandatory minimum firearm statute,
which increased the defendant’s sentence beyond the statutory maximum. The court
upheld the decision, which in some ways set the stage for the relevant conduct provision
in the Federal Guidelines (Berman, 2005).
The Guidelines system held steady throughout the 1990s, but came under fire by
the year 2000. The first major challenge came in Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000). In this
case, a sentencing judge applied a hate crime enhancement in order to increase an
offender’s sentence beyond the statutory Guidelines maximum – something that had been
done consistently since the Guidelines were implemented in 1987. Enhancements
generally add a level or two to the offender’s offense score. This enhancement, per the
Guidelines, was made based on a preponderance of evidence standard. The sentence was
appealed, and ruled unconstitutional and in violation of the Due Process Clause in the
14th Amendment, which the court interpreted as prohibiting the increase of a sentence
beyond the statutory maximum based on factual determination by a judge rather than a
jury. Thus, according to the Constitution, in order to apply the enhancement, the facts
must be found by a jury according to the beyond a reasonable doubt standard, not by a
judge according to more relaxed preponderance of evidence standard. Despite this
decision, the Guidelines still seemed to be in good standing, because Apprendi applied
only to the sentencing system in New Jersey, not the Federal system (Frase, 2007).
The Guidelines received a sterner challenge four years later in Washington v.
Blakely (2004). This case involved the Washington State Sentencing Guidelines, which
operated in almost the exact same way as the Federal Guidelines. In this case, a
sentencing judge enhanced a sentence because he found, based on preponderance of
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evidence, that the defendant acted with “deliberate cruelty.” The sentence was appealed
and found unconstitutional, this time in violation of the 6th Amendment, which refers to
the defendant’s constitutional right to have a jury determine, beyond a reasonable doubt,
all facts legally relevant to a sentence. The court ruled that sentences could not increase
beyond the statutory maximum other than by the standard spelled out in the 6th
Amendment. This decision was a much larger threat to the Federal Guidelines than
Apprendi and potentially threatened the entire system, because while it still applied to a
state-level system, the Washington State Guidelines were almost functionally
indistinguishable from the Federal Guidelines.
If Apprendi had a small impact on the Guidelines, and Blakely had a larger one,
the biggest challenge of all was still to come. Shortly after Blakely, United States v.
Booker (2005) applied the Blakely ruling to the Federal Guidelines. In Booker, the
Federal Guidelines were ruled unconstitutional, in violation of the 6th Amendment. This
ruling resulted in a massive change to the structure of the Guidelines. Until this time, the
Guidelines were mandatory, but in order to meet the requirements in the 6th Amendment,
the Guidelines became advisory. Judges were still required to consider (e.g. calculate)
the Guidelines, but they could then depart from them, with a justification. These
departures were then subject to appellate review under a reasonableness standard. The
question became – what is reasonable?
This question was addressed in three cases in 2007: United States v. Rita, United
States v. Gall, and United States v. Kimbrough. Rita was the first test of the Booker
remedy of making the Guidelines advisory and out-of-range departures subject to a
reasonableness standard review. Rita clarified this standard by finding that sentences
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within the Guidelines range should be considered reasonable. Essentially, the Guidelines
range represented the default range for what is reasonable. This decision may have
created a “gravitational pull” of sorts (Dillon, 2008) toward within-range sentences.
Departures must be justified as exceptional cases featuring exceptional circumstances.
To this point, there was no real sense of what those exceptional circumstances might be,
or if out-of-range sentencing is ever appropriate. If Booker made the Guidelines
advisory, but appellate review kept most, if not all, sentences in the Guidelines range,
then it might be best to think of the Guidelines as technically advisory, but effectively
mandatory. This is because in practice, it was still rare to see sentences outside of the
Guidelines range.
Another 2007 case, United States v. Gall, gave more insight on what is reasonable
and what is not. While Rita showed that within-range sentences are necessarily
reasonable, Gall declared that out-of-range sentences are not necessarily unreasonable.
That is, sentences outside of the Guidelines range are permissible in the post-Booker era.
In United States v. Kimbrough, the Supreme Court found, once again, that judges could
sentence outside of the Guidelines range and that those sentences could be deemed
reasonable. Thus, these follow-ups to Booker show that while the within-range sentences
are reasonable, out-of-range sentences can be reasonable too. Still, the criteria and
conditions under which this is appropriate remain relatively unclear.

Booker & Sentencing Outcomes
The empirical research on United States v. Booker is fairly limited; however, it
does address a number of key questions that demand further attention in the literature.
Three studies in particular, Hofer (2007); Ulmer et al. (2011a); Ulmer et al. (2011b),
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provide an entry into some of these empirical issues. Specifically, these studies, as well
as the United States Sentencing Commission Report (2006), touch on the general impact
of Booker, the influence of race/ethnicity on sentencing outcomes before and after
Booker, the impact of Booker relative to other policy shifts over time, and the role of
social context factors on sentencing outcomes before and after Booker. These issues are
important because sentencing policy assumes that outcomes are based on legally relevant
variables, such as the offense that was committed, and the record of the offender. In
reality, other factors often come into play, not limited to those mentioned above. Thus,
together, both legally relevant and extra-legal variables influence sentencing outcomes,
so it is important that the literature focus on both types.
Each of these studies use data compiled by the United States Sentencing
Commission (USSC). This is a rich data source, constructed annually, which contains a
large pool of information on offenders sentenced to Federal offenses. The data contain
not only information on legally relevant variables, such as whether the offender received
a custodial sanction, the length of a potential sentence, the type of crime, and the number
of charges filed against the offender, but they also contain information on extra-legal
variables, such as race/ethnicity, gender, age, educational, citizenship status, and so on.
One of the key findings from the Sentencing Commission Report (2006) is that in
the first couple of years following the Booker decision, the majority of federal cases still
conformed to sentencing guidelines. That is, even though the mandatory guidelines were
made advisory, judges still conformed to them more often than not. Specifically, the
conformance rate was 85.9% (USSC, 2006: 192). This suggests that following the
decision, the majority of cases were not sentenced outside of the Guidelines’ advised
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ranges, so if more discretion was available to judges, they weren’t always using it. Other
studies also produce interesting findings. For example, in terms of sentence length,
beginning as early as 1991, Hofer (2007) finds a gradual rise in sentence severity over
time, but a sudden decrease prior to Booker (most likely, resulting from the Blakely
decision). Likewise, Ulmer et al. (2011a) also find a gradual rise in sentence length since
the PROTECT Act was instituted in 2002. The PROTECT Act was implemented as way
to reign in the use of downward departures, which resulted in, on average, more lenient
sentences (see Friddle & Sands, 2004). After the Booker decision, however, those levels
of severity returned to pre-Blakely levels. This suggests that both judges and prosecutors
adapted to policy shifts: judges by potentially applying discretion more actively, and
prosecutors by altering charging practices. Moreover, Ulmer et al. (2011a) find that even
post-Booker, non-whites, males, and non-citizens are the most likely to be incarcerated.
They also find that the magnitude of the effect of an offender’s prior criminal record on
sentencing outcomes declined after Booker. This is consistent with expectations, as one
of the primary reasons that federal judges gave for distaste with the federal guidelines
was mandatory over-reliance on criminal history (see Hofer, 2007). Thus, after Booker,
criminal history was not as predictive of sentence severity, but it was still an important
factor. Finally, Ulmer et al. (2011b) suggest that, in practice, criminal history actually
counts against offenders twice – once as part of the presumptive sentence
recommendation embedded in the Guidelines, and a second time by influencing judge’s
sentencing decisions with the guideline boundaries. If Booker made judges less reliant on
the guidelines (see Hofer, 2007), then the decision would prevent this sort of double
counting.
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The Ulmer et al. (2011b) paper focuses explicitly on racial disparity with respect
to the Booker decision. This is salient because one of the original purposes of the Federal
Guidelines was to reduce unwarranted disparity in sentencing outcomes. Researchers
have suggested that the opposite may have happened (see Tonry, 1996, for example). If
Booker essentially reversed the Guidelines, then it is important to examine whether a shift
toward more discretionary sentencing, at least on the judicial side, has been able to
reduce such disparity. Ulmer et al. (2011a) do not find evidence of this. Their results
suggest that race/ethnicity exerts influence over sentence length across time period, such
that non-whites are subject to more severe sanctions both before and after Booker.
However, their findings also suggest that with respect to custodial (incarceration)
sanctions, much less disparity is evident. Moreover, they find no change in racial
disparity in sentencing outcomes following the Booker or Gall decisions.

Finally, they

argue that racial disparity is linked to criminal history, and such disparity is reduced
substantially when robust measures of criminal history are included in statistical models.
In short, their results suggest that judicial discretion has a limited influence on sentencing
outcomes and is particularly relevant with respect to non-custodial sanctions. They do
not find evidence to support the hypothesis that shifts in discretion (through Booker and
Gall) affect racial disparity in sentencing outcomes.
Aside from Booker, there are a variety of policy shifts since the implementation of
the Federal Guidelines, which have led to changes in sentencing outcomes. Such shifts
include not only Federal policy such as the PROTECT Act, Booker itself, and the Gall
decision, but also state-level decisions that had an influence on Federal sentencing, such
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as Blakely. In general, these other cases represent “fine-tuning”, while the Booker
decision had an abrupt, definitive effect on sentencing policy.
Some empirical research on the Booker decision (e.g., Ulmer et al., 2011a; Ulmer
et al., 2011b) consider these policy shifts by partitioning the data into four time periods –
1) the period before the PROTECT Act was passed; 2) the time period after the
PROTECT Act, but before Booker; 3) the period after Booker, but before Gall, and 4) the
post-Gall period. This allows researchers to make comparisons across time period,
without having these policy shifts confound the results. These studies tend to find
general increases in sentence length over time (Hofer, 2007; Ulmer et al., 2011a; Ulmer
et al., 2011b). However, the data do not clearly link these shifts to policy changes.
Rather, it seems that sentencing may simply follow a trend toward more punitive
sanctions over time with policy shifts, at best, slightly mitigating the rise in severity. The
PROTECT Act essentially made non-government sponsored downward departures more
difficult to come by, which can account for the longer mean sentence length (Friddle &
Sands, 2004). Research indicates that most places show an extremely high compliance
rate with the guidelines, even post-Booker and post-Gall, which helps explain those
trends (Ulmer et al., 2011a; Ulmer et al., 2011b).
Finally, it is important to consider the role that social context plays in sentencing
outcomes. Sentencing decisions are not made in isolation. Instead, they are the product
of courtrooms as communities (see Johnson et al., 2008). Thus, it is crucial to account
for aggregate-level characteristics to completely understand these individual-level
sentencing outcomes. As such, Ulmer et al. (2011a) examine not only variation across
time, but also across district. They find evidence of similarity, rather than difference,
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across district following Booker. That is, sentencing practices across place do not seem
any more divergent after Booker than they were before. Thus, expanding judicial
discretion did not make sentencing outcomes appear any more or less uniform or
consistent. This is likely due to the “gravitational pull” toward the Guideline sentences
that occurs even post-Booker. Moreover, they find that districts with higher mean
offense levels and higher judicial caseloads also tend to have higher rates of incarceration
both before and after Booker. Notably, Ulmer et al. do not control for district
characteristics, using district as a proxy for a range of characteristics that likely vary
across district. Perhaps what is missing from these analyses is a consideration of more
specific community characteristics such as community demographics (e.g. racial
composition, aggregate income levels, and so on), which could speak to the ways that
specific community characteristics influence sentencing outcomes, at both the individual
and aggregate-levels. If more discretion truly is available to judges post-Booker, then
these aggregate-level characteristics may exert an important influence on judicial
sentencing decisions.
In sum, the limited research on the Booker decision has covered a lot of ground.
These studies have produced insight with respect to general effects, race/ethnicity effects,
the impact of policy shifts over time, and social context. As a whole, this body of work
suggests that Booker has had limited impact on sentencing outcomes. However, despite
the richness of the USSC data, it has some limitations. For example, data on offender’s
income is not very reliable. Moreover, the data covers a limited time frame (1987Present). Still, the data are the richest source of federal sentencing information and the
studies to date have not completely exhausted their analytic utility. It is possible that
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despite a lack of evidence of a Booker effect in broad analyses, disaggregated analyses
might show that Booker has some specific effects. To reiterate, Booker is the most
important case to examine with respect to Federal Sentencing Guidelines. It was in the
aftermath of Booker that the Guidelines were changed from mandatory to advisory, so
this case represents the most logical starting point.

Focal Concerns
The focal concerns perspective (Steffensmeier et al., 1993; 1998) suggests that
during sentencing, judges take three factors into consideration: the offender’s
blameworthiness, the offender’s danger to the community, and finally practical
constraints and consequences.
Blameworthiness refers to the offender’s level of culpability and accountability.
The more blameworthy the offender, the more deserving he/she is of punishment. An
offender’s blameworthiness is often linked to legally-relevant variables, such as the
gravity of the offense and the offender’s prior criminal history. The offender’s perceived
role in the offense, as well as mitigating factors, such as prior victimization could also
influence the level of blameworthiness attributed to an offender.
The next focal concern, community protection, focuses on making predictions
about future levels of offending. The more likely the offender is to recidivate, the more
they are seen as a danger to the community. Assessments of danger to the community
can include legally relevant factors, such as offense severity, criminal history, and
indicators of the nature of the offense such as whether a weapon was used. On the other
hand, these assessments can also include potentially mitigating or aggravating extra-legal
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factors, such as substance abuse, education, employment, family history, and so on. The
more likely an offender is to recidivate, the more likely judges are to sentence punitively.
A final focal concern is practical constraints and consequences. These can
include a variety of things, such as characteristics of the offender, or organization
variables, in the interest of maintaining relationships among courtroom actors (e.g.,
judges, prosecutors, public defenders, and so on). Specifically, practical constraints
could refer to things like caseloads, local correctional resources, or at the individuallevel, the offender’s health, family ties, or other needs.
While this perspective sounds parsimonious and straightforward, in practice, these
processes can get complicated. While the perspective suggests that judges evaluate these
three criteria and punish offenders based on those assessments, judges rarely have access
to complete information regarding blameworthiness, community protection, and practical
constraints. Thus, they develop “perceptual shorthands” (Steffensmeier et al., 1998) to
reduce some of this uncertainty. Often, these shorthands are linked to extra-legal
characteristics, such as race/ethnicity, gender, and age. It is not uncommon for judges to
base such shorthands on stereotypes and perceptions in society.
In essence, judges use these shorthands as a means to reach the most appropriate
sentencing decisions. They generally attempt to meet the goals of deterring future crime,
protecting society, and rehabilitating offenders. The use of race/ethnicity, gender, and
age as shorthands reflect previous experience interacting with offenders and situations.
In short, the shorthands become “patterned responses” (see Albonetti, 1991) based on
what they have seen in the past. Use of these shorthands also helps process cases
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efficiently to keep the justice system moving. To the extent that these responses become
solidified, they are more likely to be replicated.
The causal attribution (Fontaine & Emily, 1978; Sims, 2003) and uncertainty
avoidance (Albonetti, 1991) perspectives fall along the same lines as focal concerns.
Causal attributions speak to the issue of predicting offenders’ likelihood of recidivating,
where judges have limited information for making these predictions. According to the
causal attribution perspective, when behaviors are attributed to internal rather than
external forces, offenders are deemed both more blameworthy and likely to recidivate. In
this way, judges use these evaluations to evaluate offenders and assign a corresponding
punishment (e.g., sentence) to them. Similarly, the uncertainty avoidance perspective
suggests that judges operate under bounded rationality (Alboneti, 1991), suggesting that
judges do not have sufficient information regarding blameworthiness, danger, or practical
constraints. In turn, judges often use extra-legal characteristics to decrease uncertainty
and reach a sentencing decision. Clearly, the focal concerns, causal attribution, and
uncertainty avoidance perspectives are closely linked and can help us understand
sentencing decisions.
As such, a large body of research has used a combination of these perspectives to
understand judicial discretion and sentencing decisions. While much of the research
finds that offense severity and criminal history are the most salient predictors of
sentencing outcomes, extra-legal characteristics (e.g., perceptual shorthands) also
influence sentencing decisions net of the legally-relevant characteristics. Specifically,
Steffensmeier & Demuth (2006) find that race/ethnicity and gender both exert effects on
sentencing outcomes above and beyond legally relevant characteristics such that men and
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non-whites receive less favorable sentencing outcomes than other groups (see also
Demuth & Steffensmeier, 2004). Moreover, Steffensmeier & Demuth (2006) find that
Hispanic offenders are sentenced more harshly in both drug and non-drug offenses and
conclude that this is because they lack the resources (e.g., adequate representation) to
resist those sanctions, and also that growing non-white populations can be interpreted as
threatening (Blalock, 1967; Ulmer & Johnson, 2004) and thus deserving of more
stringent social controls. Steffensmeier et al. (1998) find that demographic
characteristics, such as race, gender, and age affect sentencing outcomes both
independently and jointly.
The majority of the studies discussed above treat odds of incarceration and
sentence length as dependent variables, but other studies conceptualize sentencing
outcomes differently, such as Harris (2009) who investigates juvenile transfer. For
example, guided by the causal attribution perspective, Harris (2009) finds that juveniles
who showed more planning, sophistication, intent, and danger were most likely to be
transferred from the juvenile to adult system. In this way, decision-makers construct a
story about offenders based on observable characteristics, and use those stories to guide
the decision-making process. Moreover, Huebner & Bynum (2006) use the focal
concerns perspective to understand parole release decisions for sex offenders. They find
that parole officers weigh community protection even more seriously than
blameworthiness, and racial minorities take longer to receive parole, but the relationship
dissolves when robust measures of parole readiness and community protection are taken
into consideration. This may reflect the differential goals of punishment across sections
of the criminal justice system. Johnson (2003) argues that mode of conviction (e.g., plea
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negotiations vs. going to trial) helps better understand uses of judicial discretion.
Specifically, the author found evidence of extra-legal factors playing a larger role in trials
than plea negotiations, most likely because offenders are punished for using courtroom
resources (e.g., a strike against them in terms of practical constraints and consequences).
Moreover, Kramer & Ulmer (2002) examine how focal concerns influence downward
departures. Again, criminal history and offense severity exert the strongest influences
over departure decisions, however, pleading guilty, gender, race, and courtroom context
(e.g., size of the surrounding area) can also play a role. Each of these studies illustrates a
link between courtroom decision making and attempts to reduce uncertainty at the
sentencing stage through causal attributions and perceptual shorthands. I will use the
remainder of this chapter to discuss the implications for these extra-legal characteristics
(e.g., focal concerns) and policy.

Race/Ethnicity & Federal Sentencing
One of the catalysts to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, and even state-level
guidelines that often preceded them, was the notion of rampant racial and ethnic disparity
in sentencing outcomes. More specifically much of the over-representation of racial
minorities in the criminal justice system could not be explained by legally relevant
variables (e.g., criminal history and offense severity), and were thus attributed to
systemic bias reflected in uneven sentencing across race and ethnicity. Thus, the
Guidelines were put into place in an attempt to introduce uniformity and consistency into
sentencing. The general sentiment at the time that the Guidelines were developed was
that judicial discretion was out of control, and if it were reigned in, much, if not all, of the
disparity could be eliminated. In hindsight, it is much more difficult to eliminate
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disparity than was anticipated by those leading the call for the Guidelines. Research
suggests that when judicial discretion is constrained, prosecutorial discretion is expanded
(see Engen et al., 2003). That is, when the importance of judicial decisions is reduced,
the importance of prosecutorial decisions (such as which crimes to charge an offender
with, and which aggravators to seek) increases.2
Many of the empirical studies of sentencing outcomes show that racial disparity is
prominent. For instance, compared to whites, blacks and Hispanics are much more likely
to receive incarceration. Many studies have found that race and ethnicity are directly
linked to the decision to incarcerate (Albonetti, 1997; Franklin, 2013a; Franklin 2013b;
Spohn & Cederbloom, 1991; Spohn et al., 1981; Spohn & Holleran, 2000; Wu &
D’Angelo, 2014). Not only are racial and ethnic minorities more likely to receive
incarceration as a sanction, but their sentences are typically more severe (longer) than
those given to whites (Britt, 2009; Bushway & Piehl, 2007; Doerner & Demuth, 2010;
Everett & Wojtkiewicz, 2002; Johnson & Betsinger, 2009; Spohn & Beichner, 2000,
Steffensmeier et al., 1993; Steffensmeier et al., 1998).
While many studies find a direct link between race/ethnicity and sentence length,
others find an indirect link. Some variables that indirectly explain the link between race
and ethnicity and sentencing include stratification resources, such as education, and
income (Albonetti et al., 1989), socioeconomic status, community ties, prior criminal
record, and pre-trial release decisions (Brennan, 2006; Demuth 2003; Lizotte, 1978), and
finally, race and ethnicity may influence how offense seriousness scores are calculated
(Kautt, 2009).

2

While the hydraulic effect and prosecutorial discretion are important elements of Federal sentencing
systems, I lack the data in this study to adequately measure these concepts.
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Another way that race and ethnicity can affect sentencing length is through
downward departures. Downward departures are situations where judges can move
offenders to a lower, more lenient cell on the sentencing grid. Most downward
departures are subject to appellate review, thus they are relatively infrequent, however
one type of departure is generally permitted – substantial assistance departures. These
departures are usually given when an offender provides information that leads to the
conviction of another offender (see Tonry, 1996). It is important to note that these
departures are typically prosecutor-initiated, rather than judge-initiated. As one might
expect, downward departures are most frequently issued to white offenders (Albonetti,
2002; Engen et al., 2003; Hartley, 2008; Johnson, 2003; Mustard, 2001). Thus,
downward departures can at least partially explain some of the racial and ethnic disparity
in sentencing outcomes.
Following this literature, I expect racial/ethnic status to play a role in sentencing
decisions. More specifically, judges who make decisions based on incomplete
information are likely to use extra-legal variables, such as race/ethnicity as shorthands to
assess blameworthiness and danger (Steffensmeier et al., 1993; Steffensmeier et al.,
1998). In general, the literature suggests that minorities are viewed as more dangerous
and more blameworthy than whites (Steffensmeier et al., 1998). With respect to
sentencing, this means that as discretion increases, so too should racial disparity in
sentencing. This leads me to my first hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: Black and Hispanic offenders will receive more severe sentences than
white offenders.
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In short, the Federal Guidelines System has not done much to change the
perception that racial disparity exists in the criminal justice system. If anything, racial
and ethnic disparity may have actually increased under the Guidelines. This is, in part,
because discretion – one of the sources of disparity in the criminal justice system – was
not eliminated, but merely shifted within the system. Another reason that disparity was
not reduced is because the Guidelines may have simply codified existing practices (see
Bushway & Piehl, 2007). There was also discretion imbedded within the Guidelines,
which is something that is often overlooked. As long as some sort of discretion is present
in sentencing systems, it is unlikely that racial and ethnicity disparity will ever be
completely eliminated.
Race/Ethnicity & Sentencing Policy

The literature on race/ethnicity and sentencing suggests that even in a determinate
system where extra-legal variables are not supposed to influence final sentencing
decisions, race/ethnicity is still strongly correlated with sentencing outcomes. By
constraining judicial discretion, the Guidelines intended to remove subjective criteria
from the sentencing process and thus eliminate racial disparity. Constraining judicial
discretion is insufficient to realize this goal, however, because judges are not the only
discretionary actors in a sentencing system. When discretion at the sentencing stage is
limited, it is necessarily expanded in other stages. For example, in this scenario,
prosecutorial discretion at the charging stage is expanded, because judges do not have as
much flexibility to adapt to charging decisions. Even if it were possible to limit both
judicial and prosecutorial discretion at once, there is some degree of discretion imbedded
within the determinate guidelines themselves. Still, if judges use race and ethnicity as
markers for danger and blameworthiness (Steffensmeier et al., 1993; Steffensmeier et al.,
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1998), then one might expect even more disparate sentences when judicial discretion is
expanded, as Booker may have done. Thus, in the context of the Booker decision, I
propose the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: Race/ethnicity effects will be stronger in cases following the Booker
decision because judges will have more access to discretion during that time period.

Gender and Sentencing
Gender is perhaps an even more robust correlate of sentencing outcomes than
race/ethnicity. However, while the majority of empirical studies find that female
offenders are treated more leniently than their male counterparts, others find that the
effect of gender is null. While gender is linked to judicial assessments of
blameworthiness and practicality, Steffensmeier et al. (1993) find that when these are
equal, male and female offenders are likely to receive similar sentences. Thus, the
gender effect may actually be an indirect one. Steury & Frank (1990) find a bivariate
relationship between gender and sentence severity; however, when other controls are
introduced into their models, they find few differences. There is also the possibility that
gender effects vary across stages of the criminal justice process, such that males and
females may receive equal treatment at the earliest stages (e.g., pre-disposition), but
more disparity is introduced as they go deeper into the process (McDonald & ChesneyLind, 2001). However, Farnworth & Teske (1995) find differential discretion at early
stages. Their results suggest that females without prior records are treated the most
leniently, and this operates through charge reductions. In fact, female offenders received
more charge reductions than male offenders under similar circumstances. Finally, even if
male and female offenders receive equal treatment, females may actually be at a
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disadvantage, because such an outcome would not account for mitigating factors that are
disproportionately relevant to female offenders, such as family and community ties,
including single-parenting situations.
In terms of types of sentences, the literature shows that male offenders are more
likely to be sentenced to custodial sanctions than female offenders (Armstrong, 1999).
Male offenders are more likely to receive recommendations for formal processing
(Bishop & Frazier, 1992), but that may vary by crime type. For example, Spohn (1999)
finds that females are less likely to receive incarceration as long as they were not
convicted of a drug offense.
In terms of sentence length, the bulk of empirical research finds that female
offenders generally receive more lenient prison sentences (Curran, 1983; Griffin &
Wooldredge, 2006; Moulds, 1980). Especially for more serious offenses, males tend to
receive harsher sentences (Armstrong, 1999). The chivalry effect may be tied to
information regarding criminal history, practical constraints, and pre-sentence report
recommendations (Jeffries et al., 2003). In particular, some studies find that female
offenders with dependent children receive more lenient sanctions as a function of family
ties. Males are also less likely to receive downward departures than are females, and
when they do, those departures tend to be smaller. While drug offenses may amplify the
odds that females receive custodial rather than non-custodial sanctions, both drug and
property offenses may result in leniency for female offenders, while violent offenses will
not (Rodriguez et al, 2006). Finally, other studies have found that the mitigating effects
of familial ties are stronger for female than male offenders (Daly, 1987). In short, for a
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variety of reasons, it seems clear that females are both less likely to receive custodial
sanctions than male offenders, and are sentenced less severely when they do.
Some literature suggests that females are actually treated more harshly, because
when they offend, they have not only committed a legal offense, but they have also
violated social gender norms (see Belknap, 2007). In a general sense, there is not a great
deal of support for this hypothesis; however, if one looks at all stages in the criminal
justice system, some evidence of this emerges. In particular, female offenders seem to
receive more severe sanctions than males at the Juvenile Justice level. Carr et al. (2008)
argues that once girls are in the Juvenile Justice system, they are subject to over-control
relative to boys, which increases official response to female deviant behavior. Once
these girls are labeled as troublesome, they are subject to greater formal social control.
Policy initiatives, such as the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act
contributed to this notion of relabeling female status offenders as more deserving of
social control. For example, Feld (2009) argues that in the past, behaviors that may have
been charged as status offenses are now being charged as criminal offenses. Finally,
Tracy et al. (2009) find that at the Juvenile Justice level, females receive harsher
sanctions and are committed to facilities at younger ages than boys are.
There is also evidence of this trend for older female offenders, but such evidence
is generally tied to violation of social norms. For example, Bickle & Peterson (1991)
found that females who lived alone were more likely to receive incarceration as a
sanction. In a sense, since these females were not subject to informal social controls,
formal agencies felt the need to compensate with formal social controls. Moreover,
females who show a prolonged pattern of offending may be treated more harshly than
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female offenders who did not display such patterns (Ball & Bostaph, 2009). Other
studies find that females with dependent children are more likely to receive incarceration
than those without them (Spohn, 1999), and this is especially true under determinate
sentencing models (Koons-Witt, 2002). Finally, Figueria-McDonough (1985) found that
males are more likely to receive sentence reductions through plea negotiations than
females. In sum, female offenders who are shown to lack informal social controls, or
when those controls are not effective, are more likely to receive severe sanctions at the
sentencing stage.
The literature discussed above shows that in the same way judges may use
race/ethnicity as an indicator of focal concerns, they may also use gender. In general,
male offenders are treated as more blameworthy and dangerous than female offenders.
Thus:
Hypothesis 3: Male offenders will receive more severe sentences than female offenders.
Gender & Sentencing Policy

The review of the literature provided earlier discusses the influence of gender on
sentencing outcomes. A somewhat different question may involve how the impact of
sentencing policy may vary across gender. That is, when judicial discretion is
constrained, and sentencing systems shift from indeterminate to determinate models, how
are female offenders affected? This may be an issue that is not considered by sentencing
commissions.
On the surface, it may seem like a non-issue. After all, the point of determinate
sentencing is to establish a system of more uniform, consistent, and fair sentencing
outcomes. The end result, however, may be one that disproportionately disadvantages
females. In a determinate system, judges are not supposed to consider extra-legal
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variables, such as gender, childcare responsibilities, and community ties. However, these
considerations may prove crucial for a complete evaluation of the impact of sentencing
reform. For example, Raeder (1993) argues that ignoring such mitigating factors fosters
unfair treatment toward female offenders. She further argues that any determinate
guidelines system should include provisions to allow departures for single parenting
situations. To disallow judges from making such exceptions, in her view, is unfair. It
also yields collateral consequences, which are absorbed by the offender’s children, who
in most cases did nothing wrong. In the absence of such allowances, unfairness has
essentially been codified into sentencing systems (Bushway & Piehl, 2007). In a sense,
the question that remains is whether discretionary sentencing affords unfair benefits to
female offenders, or whether determinate systems treat female offenders unfairly by not
making such considerations. It seems likely that when the constraints of determinate
sentencing are lifted, for example, through a decision like Booker, that females may
benefit more than males in terms of sentencing outcomes. Little, if any, literature to date
has addressed this issue. Given the role of policy in the wake of the Booker decision, I
expect the following:
Hypothesis 4: Females will be treated with even greater leniency following the Booker
decision because judges will have more flexibility to treat gender as a mitigating
circumstance.

Age & Sentencing
A third demographic characteristic that may correlate with sentencing outcomes is
the offender’s age. Age is a fairly robust predictor of sentencing outcomes, in that
younger offenders are both more likely to be incarcerated and likely to receive more
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severe sentences than are older offenders. Few studies treat age as a key independent
variable, but there are some worth discussing. For example, in one of the few studies
using Federal sentencing data that focuses on age, Doerner & Demuth (2010) found that
young defendants, on average, receive harsher sentences than older defendants, while
controlling for legal factors. Moreover, using data from the Pennsylvania State
Sentencing Commission, Steffensmeier et al. (1995) found that older offenders were less
likely to be incarcerated, and if they were, likely to receive more lenient sentences. They
also found that the relationship between age and sentencing was non-linear, in that the
peak for sentence severity was about 21-27, with a decline after that. Finally, Champion
(1987) found a trend of increasing leniency for sentencing of the elderly from 1970-1984,
but the sanctions were more severe in Southern than Northern jurisdictions.
Again, judges use age as an indicator of blameworthiness and likelihood of reoffending, just as they use race/ethnicity and gender in the same way. Thus:
Hypothesis 5: Older offenders will be sentenced more leniently than younger offenders.
Age & Sentencing Policy

If the literature suggests that older offenders are generally treated with more
lenience than younger defenders, what effect would determinate sentencing structures
have on these older offenders? If judges do not have as much discretion, then they will
be unable to take age and, in turn, practical constrains such as an offender’s health
concerns, and the ability for the prison facility to care for those persons. Conversely,
under a determinate system, judges would be unable to treat offenders younger than 21
leniently, on the grounds that they may not have been fully culpable at that age (see
Steffensmeier, 1995). Thus, under a determinate system, those offenders who do not fall
between the 21-27 age range will likely be sentenced more harshly than they might in an
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indeterminate system where judges have more discretion. Finally, in the post-Booker era,
I expect to find the following:
Hypothesis 6: Age effects will be stronger following the Booker decision, where, on
average, older offenders will be treated more leniently.
While the hypotheses discussed thus far make predictions about the influence of
race/ethnicity, gender, and age separately, it is likely that they work together to influence
sentencing outcomes. In the next section, I will discuss how these status characteristics
could have multiplicative effects on sentencing outcomes.

The Intersections of Race/Ethnicity, Gender & Age
As the focal concerns, uncertainty avoidance, and causal attribution perspectives
illustrate, race/ethnicity, gender, age, and other extra-legal characteristics influence
sentencing outcomes above and beyond legally-relevant variables such as offense
severity and criminal history. Perhaps more importantly, the effects of these extra-legal
characteristics should be treated multiplicatively rather than additively. That is, it is not
enough to examine race/ethnicity, gender, and age in isolation from one another, because
these characteristics interact. For example, white men are likely to receive sentences that
are different from black and Hispanic men and also ones that are different from white
women. Moreover, younger white men are likely to receive sentences that are different
from older white men, or older black men, or so on. It is important to embrace these
intricacies when examining variation in sentencing decisions across race/ethnicity,
gender, age, and other extra-legal factors.
The literature suggests that not all female offenders are treated alike. Moreover,
in some cases, certain sub-groups of female offenders may not be treated any more
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leniently than certain sub-groups of males. For example, some research indicates that
black females are sentenced about as harshly as white males (Spohn, 1985; Steffensmeier
& Demuth, 2006). Perhaps the most prominent study of sentencing disparity that takes
gender and other key status dimensions into account is Steffensmeier et al.’s (1993; 1998)
work that focused on gender, race, and age of offenders. In general, they found that
young, black males are sentenced more harshly than any other group, but they also found
differential sentencing of females across race and ethnicity, such that black females were
sentenced more harshly than white females.
Other research also finds differential gender effects across race and ethnicity.
Race and ethnicity have been linked to enhanced sentences for female offenders
(Crawford, 2000), incarceration decisions and sentence length (Crew, 1991; Crow &
Kunselman, 2009; Spohn, 2013), pre-trial release (Demuth & Steffensmeier, 2004),
adjudication (Freiburger & Burke, 2011), and dispositions (Horowitz & Pottieger, 1991;
Moore & Padavic, 2010) to the disadvantage of Hispanic and black females. Moreover,
blacks are more likely than whites to receive further court processing at intake (Leiber &
Mack, 2003), and black and Hispanic females are more likely than white females to
receive jail sentences (Brennan, 2006). Finally, female offenders who fall into the lower
socio-economic status are more likely to receive severe sanctions (Brennan, 2006;
Kruttschnitt, 1981). Clearly, researchers should account for not only gender, but also
other status dimensions in order to fully understand the complexities of gender and
sentencing.
Another important dimension is age. Age and other characteristics (such as
gender) may interact with each other to explain sentencing outcomes, so it is important to
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treat them multiplicatively. For example, older white women are likely to have a
different experience than young Hispanic women. Thus, instead of treating these
characteristics additively, they should be treated as interactive. A number of studies have
done this. Using data from Pennsylvania, Steffensmeier et al. (1993; 1998) find that the
race/ethnicity-gender-age combination receiving the harshest penalties is young Hispanic
males. A more recent examination of this at the Federal level found that while young
Hispanic males have the highest odds of incarceration, young black males receive the
longest sentences (Doerner & Demuth, 2010). Moreover, Steffensmeier and Motivans
(2000) found that while older offenders are generally sentenced less harshly, the effect is
stronger for males than for females. Taken together, this research suggests that it is
important to look at these factors in conjunction. Thus, I predict the following:
Hypothesis 7: Non-white males will receive harsher sentences that other race/ethnicitysex combinations.
Hypothesis 8: Young, non-white males will receive harsher sentences than other agerace/ethnicity-sex combinations.
Intersectionality & Sentencing Policy

In the same way that race/ethnicity, gender, and age interact to explain variation
in sentencing outcomes in a general sense, they also interact to explain the role of policy.
While a stringent policy will generally constrain judges from relying heavily on extralegal effects to interpret focal concerns, a lax policy will give them more freedom to do
so. Thus, I predict the following intersectional effects following the Booker decision:
Hypothesis 9: The effects of being a non-white male will be stronger following the
Booker decision, such that non-white males will receive even more punitive sentences.
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Hypothesis 10: The effects of being a young, non-white male will be stronger following
the Booker decision, such that non-white males will receive even more punitive
sentences.
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Chapter 3: SOCIAL CONTEXT AND SENTENCING
Individual-level characteristics of offenders are not the only extra-legal variables
that can influence sentencing outcomes. Although policy initiatives, such as the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines are meant to introduce uniformity, consistency, and fairness into
sentencing, the effects of those policies can vary across place. Specifically, one might
anticipate district-level variation in the effects of both legal and extra-legal characteristics
on sentencing outcomes.
In their study of Pennsylvania State Sentencing Guidelines, Kramer and Ulmer
(2009) propose a theoretical model where they outline the factors that influence
sentencing, both at the aggregate and individual levels. They argue that societal factors,
such as criminal justice system politics and structural stratification patterns influence
state- and county-level factors, including actual policies (e.g., guidelines systems,
mandatory minimum policies, truth in sentencing) as well as community-level politics
and correctional resources. These factors help shape courtroom communities and their
associated cultures and norms. All of this filters down to the focal concerns which
Steffensmeier et al. (1993; 1998) discuss. Finally, these focal concerns influence
sentencing outcomes.
One of the key pillars of the focal concerns perspective is practical constraints and
consequences (Steffensmeier et al., 1993; 1998). This concept captures a lot, including
contextual variables (e.g., local community characteristics, demographics, correctional
resources, and so on). Characteristics of the sentencing locality are important, not only
because they might have direct influences on sentencing outcomes, but because they
might also condition the effects of more proximate, individual-level characteristics on
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sentencing decisions. These social context characteristics can be divided into three
categories: political climate, community characteristics, and courtroom community.

Political Climate
Over time, political climate has influenced social control in important ways (for a
rich discussion of this, see Garland, 2001). Broadly, research indicates that locales with
more conservative political climates tend to utilize tighter social controls to constrain
crime (Helms & Jacobs, 2002; Jacobs & Helms, 2001; Jacobs & Helms, 1999). These
studies typically use measures of Republican party strength, generally measured as the
proportion of votes going to the Republican candidate in the most recent Presidential
election, to capture political climate. Clearly, there are other methods for measuring
political climate, but this seems the most prevalent.
A conservative political climate generally represents a “law and order” approach
to dealing with crime. More specifically, such a climate likely favors crime control over
due process (Garland, 2001). That is, punishing potential criminals becomes paramount.
Conversely, an approach that favors due process would allow for some offenders to go
free, so long as those who are unjustly accused for crimes are not punished.
These conservative, Republican regimes are much more likely to dedicate
resources to crime control, which may including expanding prison admissions, fortifying
police forces, building new prisons, and potentially de-emphasizing intermediate
sanctions. The movement toward determinate sentencing certainly represents a shift
toward crime control (for more, see Chapter 2).
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Under a more indeterminate system, Federal judges are likely to consider the
surrounding political climate, and sentence accordingly.3 In more conservative districts,
judges may be less likely to engage in downward departures, even when the option is
available to them. They may expect that appellate review would not proceed in a
favorable way in such districts, and decide to conserve courtroom resources by not going
through the process at all.
This notion of political climate has been used to examine numerous social control
outcomes. Particularly at the sentencing stage, judicial decision-making is likely
influenced by local political and social climates (Britt, 2000; Johnson et al., 2008).
Specifically, research finds that conservative political climates are associated with
expansions in prison admissions (Jacobs & Helms, 2001; Jacobs & Helms, 1996; Jacobs
& Jackson, 2010) and spending on corrections (Jacobs & Helms, 1999; Jacobs &
Jackson, 2010). Moreover, quite often, political context interacts with individual-level
offender characteristics, such as race/ethnicity and gender, to explain variation in
criminal justice outcomes (Helms & Constanza, 2010; Helms & Jacobs, 2000; Helms &
Jacobs, 2002). For example, Helms and Jacobs (2002) found that African Americans and
males tend to receive more punitive sanctions when they are sentenced in courts
embedded within conservative political climates. Similarly, Keen and Jacobs (2009)
found that political climate interacts with aggregate-level racial composition to explain
disparity in prison admissions, particularly in Southern states. Taken together, this body

3

Although Federal judges are appointed rather than elected, it is still reasonable to think that political
climate could affect their sentencing decisions. While they don’t have to worry about conforming to
voters, they also do not want to cause disturbances with those who appoint them. Moreover, it is likely that
the general political climate affects these decisions subconsciously rather than explicitly. That is, political
climate may affect judicial decision making without judges even realizing it.
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of research speaks to more punitive climates in contexts where Republican party strength
is the most pronounced. Thus, with respect to political climate, I predict the following:
Hypothesis 11: Offenders sentenced in districts with a greater proportion of the
population voting Republican, on average, receive harsher sanctions.
In the same way that sentencing outcomes vary across social context, I expect that
the impact of policy on sentencing outcomes will also vary across social context. Judicial
decision-making is extremely contingent on local cultural, social, and political influences.
Thus, place will influence exactly how discretion affects sentencing across various
jurisdictions. This has implications for both policy, such as the Booker decision, and
other extra-legal variables. Taken together, this body of literature suggests that it is
important to account for social context (including place) when interpreting variation in
sentencing outcomes. Given the role of policy in sentencing outcomes, I predict that:
Hypothesis 12: Offenders sentenced in more politically conservative climates, on
average, receive harsher sanctions following Booker than before.

Racial & Ethnic Threat
The influence of local context can extend beyond politics. A variety of studies
also look at aggregate-level compositional variables to understand variation across social
control outcomes. In general, these studies are guided by Blalock’s (1967) minoritygroup threat hypothesis. Minority-group threat suggests that as minority groups
accumulate size and access to resources, the dominant group feels threatened. In
response to this threat, the dominant group acts to tighten social controls against the
growing minority-group. This may include increasing police presence, using more
coercive police action against members of these groups, or sentencing more harshly.
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Blalock (1967) broadly conceptualizes threat in a number of ways (also see King,
2007; Tolnay et al., 1989a; Tolnay et al., 1989b). While the most straight-forward
conceptualization of threat is the proportion of the group presenting the threat (often, but
not always, minority-group members), this is not the only way to consider it. Another
potential manifestation of threat is the accumulation of political power. This is at the
core of Blalock’s idea. The size of the minority population is not necessarily important
on its own, but is important to the extent that it can threaten the status quo. That is, when
the size of the population results in a shift of the distribution of political power, then the
dominant group is more likely to respond. As such, more appropriate measure of threat
may be some operationalization of political power, such as civic participation or nonwhite political representation, as evidenced by the presence or proportion of nondominant group members holding political positions (see Jacobs, 1998 for an example).
Thus, a simple measure of minority-group size may be less than sufficient to fully test
Blalock’s ideas.
Another type of threat may have more to do with economics than sheer presence
or even accumulation of political power. Thus, some measure of access to resources is an
important component of minority-group threat. With a limited amount of resources
available, each group does what they can to maximize its potential to get them.
Therefore, the success of one group could be interpreted as threat by another. This is
more closely in line with a resource competition model of threat (Lyons, 2007; Olzak,
1992). Measures of this type of threat could include race/ethnicity-specific
unemployment rates, income inequality, or some measure of disadvantage.
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Again, while Blalock’s perspective sounds straightforward, there are a couple of
nuances that are often overlooked. First, Blalock suggests that the relationship between
threat and social response is not necessarily linear. That is, the functional form of the
response to threat depends both on the level of threat, and the context in which the threat
occurs. The most general application of this is that responses are unlikely at both low
and high levels of threat, but much more likely at the mid-range. It is not always this
parsimonious, though, as there are certain contexts where social responses are triggered at
very low levels of threat (defended neighborhoods), while others not triggered until
extremely high levels (flight). Moreover, the nature of the response can vary across both
threat level and context. I discuss some of these functional forms further later in the
chapter (see also Lyons, 2007).
Finally, even though Blalock’s ideas are often tested using cross-sectional data, he
does not really imply that the level of threat at a particular moment in time triggers a
response. Instead, he suggests that when levels of threat increase rapidly over a relatively
short period of time (and not altogether different from Durkheim’s (1897) arguments
about social change and anomie, though, on a smaller scale), social response is more
likely. Thus, cross-sectional approaches to minority-group threat are not necessarily in
the spirit of Blalock’s theoretical perspective.
In sum, minority-group threat is usually measured by the size of the non-white
population in a given area.4 According to Blalock, as the population grows, threat
increases, which is met with tighter social controls against the members of the minority
group. More comprehensive measures of threat might include quadratic terms, measures
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Though, it is often measured in a more sophisticated way using conditional indicators, such as minority
size in conjunction with economic conditions, political threat, or other factors.
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of unemployment or other economic indicators, measures of political power, such as civic
participation or non-white political representation, or change in threat levels over time.
Studies that examine the threat perspective and sentencing outcomes have offered
mixed results. Some studies support the link between threat and sentence severity. For
example, Bontrager et al. (2005) found that black defendants are more likely to have
adjudication withheld in places with higher property crimes rates and greater levels of
concentrated disadvantage. Moreover, other studies find that income inequality
(Carmichael, 2005) and racial composition (Weidner et al., 2005; Wooldredge, 2007)
predict variation in sentencing outcomes. Wang & Mears (2010) found that increasing
levels of threat increased the odds of receiving a prison sentence when baseline levels of
threat were high, and Greenberg & West (2001) found evidence of elevated
imprisonment rates in states with larger black populations.
Conversely, a number of studies do not fully support the threat perspective. For
example, Britt (2000) finds that sanctions tend to be more severe for all offenders, not
just minority-group offenders, in places (in this case, court jurisdictions) with large black
populations. Racial threat (measured by black population size) did not appear to affect
sentencing outcomes for habitual offenders (Crawford et al., 1998), for drug trafficking
offenders (Kautt, 2002), or in large urban counties (Weidner et al, 2004). Finally,
Feldmeyer & Ulmer (2011) found that black population did not affect the sentencing of
black offenders, and that Hispanic defendants were actually sentenced more harshly in
places with small Hispanic populations, and more leniently in places with the largest
Hispanic populations. Finally, Myers and Talarico (1987) found that all offenders, not
just African American ones, are sentenced more harshly in jurisdictions with larger
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African American populations, which is inconsistent with Blalock’s hypothesis, at least
the most straightforward versions of it. In short, with respect to sentencing, some studies
find support for the racial/ethnic threat perspective, while others do not, but even those
that do not find support for threat do suggest variation in outcomes by place.
Perhaps one reason for the mixed findings is the way that threat is conceptualized.
It is entirely possible that measuring threat simply as the size of the minority-population
is overly simplistic. Other measures may include levels of civic participation, recent
growth in the minority populations, or even minority-group organization. Most likely,
population size offers a reasonable proxy for levels of threat, but including more
sophisticated measures could help better illustrate the precise mechanisms at work.
Stults and Baumer (2007) extend racial threat to include whites’ fear of crime,
perceived economic threat, black political threat, and anti-black prejudice. After all,
Blalock’s hypothesis suggests that the tightening of social controls is triggered when the
dominant group interprets threat impinging upon their position in the status quo. Thus, in
order for social controls against the minority group to become enhanced, the dominant
group must interpret threat. Therefore, perceptions of danger and economic threat seem
important for understanding the dynamics at work. The authors find that whites’ fear of
crime and perceptions of economic threat help explain expansions in police force size.
While this represents a fairly narrow application of the expanded hypothesis, it is
reasonable to think that it could also be applied to other social control outcomes, such as
sentencing.
Another potential explanation is that there are other manifestations of threat.
Blalock predicts that social control increases exponentially with non-white population;
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however there are other possibilities. Using the threat perspective to explain raciallymotivated crime, Green et al. (1998) offer other possibilities: a power differential
hypothesis, a random interaction hypothesis, a residual tipping point hypothesis, and a
defended neighborhoods hypothesis. The power differential hypothesis suggests that as
the population of the dominant group increases, the incidence of racially-motivated (and
non-racially-motivated) crimes is higher. Under this explanation, the dominant group
holds the majority of the power and they will use their leverage to keep it that way. The
random interaction hypothesis suggests that incidence levels of racially motivated crime
are low when the majority group occupies either a large proportion or a small proportion
of the population, but the incidence levels are higher when population levels are largely
equal. This may suggest that there is a certain point where minority-group size triggers
specific responses, but those responses may dissipate if the minority-group population
continues to grow. The residential tipping point hypothesis suggests, again, that
responses against minority-group members are most likely when that group occupies a
small proportion of the population, but those responses decline quickly as the population
size for this group grows. This idea differs from the power threat hypothesis in that the
decline in incidents is much more rapid here. Finally, the defended neighborhoods
hypothesis suggests that responses depend on the speed of in-migration. That is, if
population composition is changing rapidly, racially-motivated crimes are more likely. If
it is not, then they are not as likely. Their results provide the strongest support for the
defended neighborhoods hypothesis. While their data related to racially-motivated
crimes, these hypothetical models could also help explain the dynamics of threat more
generally. Given this body of research, I test the following hypothesis:
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Hypothesis 13: Offenders sentenced in districts characterized by larger black population
and greater levels of immigrant concentration are likely to receive harsher sentences, but
the relationship will be non-linear.5
Again, I also want to see how the effect of these aggregate-level variables might vary
across time, so I hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 14: Offenders sentenced in districts with larger non-white populations and
greater levels of immigrant concentration receive harsher sanctions following Booker
than before.

Female Labor Force Participation
In addition to racial composition, aggregate-level gender variables could affect
sentencing outcomes as well. In a broad sense, factors such as female labor-force
participation, and more generally, patriarchy, could have implications for CJS outcomes.
Female labor-force participation indicates the proportion of women who are working. On
the surface, higher levels of female labor-force participation could represent growing
equality, but not necessarily. It is entirely possible that the bulk of female participants
are working in low income positions, or at least those lower than similarly-skilled men.
Thus, greater levels of participation in labor force may in some ways represent strides
toward equality, but in other ways simply represent a different form of oppression. On
the surface, greater representation in the labor force represents equality (even if it is not
so), and with greater equality comes less chivalrous treatment toward women. Thus,
women could become more vulnerable to sanction from the criminal justice system,
where otherwise, gender would be more likely treated as a mitigating factor.
5

While I cannot test for all of the possibilities discussed earlier, I can test for non-linearity. That is, one
might expect that increasing levels of black population could produce punitive sentences, but once the
population reaches a certain level, the effect could diminish. Later chapters also test for contextual effects.
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While little research has explored criminal justice system outcomes linked to
aggregate-level gender inequality explicitly, some research has examined the implications
for crime. In particular, research finds that gender equality is associated with decreases
in intimate partner violence (Reckdenwald & Parker, 2008; Xie et al., 2012). Moreover,
gender equality has implications for female offending, however, the influences can vary
by offense type (Parker & Reckdenwald, 2008; Reckdenwald & Parker, 2008), but may
also be reflective of the social positions of both males and females (Hunnicutt & Broidy,
2004). Finally, structural variables may explain offending across gender, however, they
are more salient for male than female offending (Schwartz, 2006; Steffensmeier &
Hayne, 2000). Overall, this suggests that where females as a whole have more resources
available to them, and where patriarchy is weaker, females often both behave and are
treated more like men. Thus, I test the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 15: Offenders sentenced in districts with high rates of female labor force
participation will receive more punitive sentences.
I also expect that the influence of Female Labor Force Participation will shift
following Booker:
Hypothesis 16: Offenders sentenced in districts with more female labor force
participation receive more lenient sanctions following Booker than before.

Courtroom Communities & Administrative Factors
A final contextual consideration is the courtroom community. Numerous local
trends influence the courtroom community including correctional resources, caseloads,
and norms and behaviors across courtroom actors. Clearly, courtroom community
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context is closely linked to the practical constraints and consequences outlined in the
focal concerns perspective.
In a broad sense, courtroom personnel (e.g., judges, prosecutors, and defense
attorneys) form courtroom workgroups (Eisenstein et al., 1988; Johnson, 2005; Kramer &
Ulmer, 2008; Ulmer & Johnson, 2004). These workgroups develop cultural norms and
goals and often work in conjunction to achieve them. Such norms include “going rates”
for sentences (Eisenstein et al., 1988), as well as interests in courtroom efficiency (Dixon,
1995; Engen & Steen, 2000).
As such, one of the goals of the courtroom workgroup is to process cases quickly
and efficiently in order to avoid a backlog of cases, thus local caseload is an important
consideration. Clearly, those cases that do go to trial can generally expect a “trial
penalty” (Engen & Steen, 2000), particularly in jurisdictions under heavy caseload
pressure. Yet another way to process cases quickly and efficiently is to rely on the focal
concerns discussed earlier. These may be especially prominent in contexts where cases
must be processed rapidly, and thus, young, non-white males can generally expect to feel
the brunt of these pressures. In short, courts form their own communities, and these
communities have general goals and norms that can influence sentencing outcomes.
Moreover, the courtroom community is not isolated from extra-legal variables and focal
concerns. Thus, I predict the following:
Hypothesis 17: Offenders sentenced in districts with higher caseloads are likely to receive
more lenient sanctions than those sentenced in districts with lower caseloads.
Finally, I expect the effect of caseload to differ following Booker:
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Hypothesis 18: Offenders sentenced in districts with higher caseloads are likely to receive
more lenient sanctions following Booker.

Cross-Level Interactions
I also expect that these contextual variables will interact with many of the
individual-level factors discussed in Chapter 2. A large body of research has found
support for the notion that social context interacts with individual-level variables,
particularly race/ethnicity variables. Social context allows discretion to creep into the
sentencing decision, and as it does so, it is likely that they will influence the effect that
extra-legal variables have on sentencing outcomes. These contextual characteristics
influence focal concerns through discretion and thus, it is likely that judges and
prosecutors will use perceptual shorthands to reach the goals of not only the courtroom
community, but the community at large.
Moreover, in the same way that I expect the influence of social context to vary
across time period (e.g., pre- and post-Booker), I also expect the interaction between
social context and race/ethnicity to vary across time period. Therefore, I propose:
Hypothesis 19: Non-white offenders sentenced in more politically conservative districts
can expect particularly severe sentences relative to white offenders.
Hypothesis 20: Non-white offenders sentenced in politically conservative districts receive
even more severe sentences following Booker.
Hypothesis 21: Non-white offenders sentenced in districts with larger non-white
populations and more immigrant concentration can expect particularly severe sentences
relative to white offenders.
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Hypothesis 22: Non-white offenders sentenced in districts with greater levels of racial
and ethnic threat receive even more severe sentences following Booker.
Hypothesis 23: Non-white offenders sentenced in districts with higher caseloads can
expect particularly severe sentences relative to white offenders.
Hypothesis 24: Non-white offenders sentenced in districts with heavier caseloads receive
even more severe sentences following Booker.
Hypothesis 25: Females sentenced in districts with more female labor force participation
can expect particularly punitive sentences relative to male offenders.
Hypothesis 26: Female offenders sentenced in districts with more female labor-force
participation receive even more punitive sanctions following Booker.
Following the literature, the majority of the cross-level interactions that I test are
between race/ethnicity indicator at the individual-level, and social context variables (e.g.,
political, community, and administrative variables) at the aggregate level. Race/ethnicity
is generally the greatest source of disparity in sentence outcomes, and this is also the
place where social context is most likely to influence judicial decision-making.
Moreover, this selection of cross-level interactions represents both a parsimonious and
theoretically meaningful approach to exploring the interactions between individual-level,
extra-legal variables, and aggregate-level contextual ones (see Feldmeyer & Ulmer, 2011,
for example). I also examine the interaction between female status and female labor
force participation, suggesting that as women approach equality (or at least, perceived
equality) toward men, they are more likely to receive similar treatment. Thus, gender
disparity may diminish in districts with greater female labor force participation.
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In the same way that I expect that judges will have more flexibility to assess
extra-legal characteristics at the case-level, I also expect that the role of social context,
and its interaction with those case-level variables, will be expanded in the post-Booker
era. This is simply a reflection of the expanded discretion allotted to judges when the
Federal Guidelines shifted from mandatory to advisory. The following chapters will
empirically test the hypotheses presented in Chapters 2 and Chapter 3. In Chapter 4, I
will discuss both the data and the techniques that I use to test them.
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Chapter 4: DATA AND METHODS
The present research draws on data from the Monitoring of Federal Criminal
Sentences database from 1999-2009. These data are compiled by the United States
Sentencing Commission (USSC) and include all federal cases from each of the 94 U. S.
districts, making this dataset the most comprehensive available for Federal offenses and
offenders6. These data include information on the sentence length, type of offense that
was committed, legal variables, such as criminal history and severity of the offense, and
extra-legal variables, such as race/ethnicity, age, gender, location (district), education,
and a variety of others. Because these data tap into both legal and extra-legal
characteristics of offenders and offenses, they are appropriate for this project. More
specifically, these data allow me to investigate the importance of policy shifts (as a proxy
for judicial discretion) in sentencing, and how it has changed since the 2005 Booker
decision. These data also allow me to look at the impact of Booker across many of the
contingencies discussed in the review of the literature, especially because I have merged
them with Census data at the district-level. Measurement and descriptive statistics for the
variables used in the analysis are displayed in Table 4.1.
I merge the USSC data with various contextual variables that I computed using
the 2000 Census and 2000 election data. These variables are aggregated from the countylevel to the district level. Counties are cleanly imbedded within much larger districts. I
analyze data from 89 districts. No counties spill over into more than one district. In
many cases, one district accounts for an entire state. No state contains more than four
districts. In order to aggregate the data up to the district level, I calculated the district

6

I include 89 of the 94 districts in my analyses. Following convention, I exclude districts such as Puerto
Rico, Guam, and other U.S. Territories.
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mean across all counties in the district. Undoubtedly, this will produce some degree of
measurement error; however, this is the most appropriate way to match Census data to
Federal court districts. Few studies have attempted to match Census characteristics to
Federal districts to date.
The district-level is the smallest aggregate-level unit available to examine Federal
sentencing outcomes. Federal cases are distributed across the districts. These districts
encompass large geographical spaces, where a single district often captures an entire
state. Some states may have up to four or five districts in the same state. There are no
districts which extend coverage into two different states. Smaller geographical units,
such as cities, and counties are embedded within districts, but specific data on dependent
variables are not available at this level.

Dependent Variable
To capture sentencing outcomes, I follow the literature (Steffensmeier et al.,
1993; Kramer & Ulmer, 2008; Spohn, 1999, for example) and examine them as two
separate outcomes. The first dependent variable is the in/out decision – whether the
offender was incarcerated. This variable is coded as “1” if the offender was incarcerated
and “0” if he/she was not. The second dependent variable is the length of the sentence in
months. The Monitoring of Federal Criminal Sentences database provides a final
sentence length for each offender. A zero month prison sentence generally reflects
probation or some other non-custodial sanction. Thus, data on sentence length tends to
be highly skewed. To address this, I take the natural log of sentence length (see
Steffensmeier et al., 1993; Steffensmeier et al., 1998). This adjusts for the non-normal
distribution of the data.
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Independent Variables
The key independent variable in this study is the timing of a case relative to the
United States v. Booker decision, which represents a proxy for shifts in judicial
discretion. Specifically, cases occurring prior to Booker (1999-2004) represent those
sentenced under limited discretion, while those occurring post-Booker (2005-2009)
represent cases sentenced under less restricted discretion. I treat the Booker variable as a
grouping variable, where I compare effects for cases before the Booker decision to those
after.7

Legal Variables
With respect to legally-relevant variables, I include measures that capture the
magnitude of the offender’s criminal history, the offense gravity (seriousness) score,
whether the offense was a violent offense, whether the offense was a drug offense,
whether the offense went to trial, and whether the offender was held in custody prior to
trial. Criminal history is measured on a continuum from 1-6, with scores of 1
representing the least extensive criminal histories, and those with 6 representing the most
extensive. For the violent offense variable, violent offenses are coded as “1,” while other
offenses are coded as 0. For the drug offense variable, drug offenses are coded as “1,”
while other offenses are coded as “0.” The offense gravity score is a measure of the
offense seriousness, accounting for all aggravating and mitigating factors, and it is
calculated by the USSC and scores range from 1-53. For the trial variable, cases that
went to trial were coded as “1” and “0” otherwise.
7

While I discuss other cases, particularly at the state-level, in the literature review, I choose not to include
them in my analyses. This is because these cases represent fine-tuning, more than explicit policy changes
in application of the Federal Guidelines. Conversely, Booker represented a significant change (e.g., the
Guidelines become advisory rather than mandatory. Some other scholars have chosen to partition the data
across these decisions (Ulmer et al., 2011), while others simply treat Booker itself as a treatment variable
(Nowacki, forthcoming). Given my hypotheses and estimation techniques, I follow the latter.
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Extra-Legal Variables
I also analyze variation across race/ethnicity, sex, and age, both as main effects
and interactions. For race/ethnicity, I constructed two dummy variables – one for nonHispanic black offenders and one for Hispanic offenders. I also dummy-coded the
offender’s sex such that 1=female and 0=male. Finally, in the main effects model, I
measure age in three categories: young (30 years old and younger), middle (31-49 years
old) and older (50 or more years old). I treat the middle group as the reference category.
For the race/ethnicity-sex combinations, I treat white males as the reference category, and
code other combinations equal to 1 (e.g., for the white female variable, offenders who
were both white and female were coded as 1). Finally, I construct race/ethnicity-sex-age
variables as I do race/ethnicity-sex combinations, where the reference category is 31-49,
white males. These age categories are similar to those that Steffensmeier et al. (1998)
used to analyze intersectionality in sentencing outcomes.
In addition to these measures, I also control for a number of other extra-legal
variables. These include level of education, citizenship status, and whether the
defendant was detained prior to the trial. Education is a continuous variable measuring
the offender’s level of education. Scores on this variable range from 0-8, where 0 = no
school 1; = elementary school; 2 = middle school; 3 = some high school; 4 = high school
graduate; 5 = vocational school; 6 = some college; 7 = college graduate; 8 = postgraduate degree. Citizenship status is a dummy variable indicating whether the offender
is a U. S. citizen (U. S. citizens coded as “1”). Pretrial custody is dummy-coded and
scored as “1” if the offender is held prior to trial. These measures could potentially
mitigate (or in some situations, aggravate) sentences, contributing to the focal concerns
discussed earlier.
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Social Context Variables
I also estimate three aggregate-level factors: political variables, community
context, and administrative variables.8 I also control for the natural log of the districtlevel violent crime rate in each model. I include four political variables: percent voting
Republican, whether the district had a Republican governor, voter participation, and
whether the district was a border district. Percent voting Republican is measured as the
percentage of persons in a district who voted for the Republican candidate in the 2004
Presidential election. The Republican governor variable is dummy-coded as “1” if the
district had a Republican governor in 2004. The voter participation variable is the total
percentage of people who voted in the 2004 Presidential election.9 Finally, the border
district variable is coded as “1” if the district is adjacent to the Mexican border.
The community context variables include the following: percent black, immigrant
concentration, disadvantage, white/black income inequality and white/Hispanic income
inequality, and female labor force participation. Percent black is simply the proportion
of blacks living in a district, and I also include a quadratic term for this variable,
consistent with Blalock’s hypothesis. Immigrant concentration is a principal component
factor consisting of the following: percent Hispanic, percent speaking a language other
than English at home, and percent foreign-born. Disadvantage is also a factor consisting
of percent living below the poverty line, joblessness (population age 16 and older
unemployed or not in the labor force), percentage of female-headed households, and lack
8

There is some concern that many of the variables discussed in this section may be highly correlated, thus
producing multi-collinearity problems. For the most part, the variables and variance inflation factors
(VIFs) were not problematic, however, the combination of female labor force participation, disadvantage,
and immigrant concentration did produce VIFs over the commonly-accepted threshold of 4.00. Thus, I do
not include female labor force participation in the same models as disadvantage and immigrant
concentration. Correlations and VIF scores are available by request.
9
I use the 2004 election as a benchmark because it most closely represents the midpoint of my data, and it
is temporally proximate to the Booker decision.
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of professional role models (the compliment of persons 16 and older who are employed
in professional and/or managerial positions). This factor follows Krivo & Peterson
(1996). White/black income inequality is measured as the ratio between white median
income and black median income, while white/Hispanic income inequality is the ratio
between white median income and Hispanic median income. Finally, female labor force
participation is measured as the percentage of females participating in the labor force,
drawn from the 2000 Census.
Finally, I include five administrative district-level variables in my analyses
including the mean district-level offense severity score, the mean district-level criminal
history score, the percentage of violent cases, the percentage of drug cases, and the
natural log of the number of cases within each district.

Analytic Strategy
This dissertation contains three results chapters: one comparing race/ethnicitysex-age combinations, one that examines both case-level (level 1) and district-level (level
2) influences on sentencing outcomes, and one that examines cross-level interactions
between level 1 and level 2 variables. The incarceration decision (e.g., in/out), given that
it is a dichotomous variable, is estimated using logistic regression, while sentence length
is estimated using ordinary least squares regression techniques. The analyses for social
context variables utilize linear mixed modeling techniques, with individual, case-level
variables at level 1 and social context variables at level 2 for the 89 districts. Linear
mixed models are appropriate because they allow me to estimate measures at each level
simultaneously. This technique also produces efficient standard errors. Moreover, this
technique also controls for correlation between districts, and allows for random slopes
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(West et al., 2007). In each chapter, the general strategy is to run models both before and
after the Booker decision for each of the three dependent variables. I then discuss
whether the effects differed across time periods by comparing coefficients using
Paternoster et al.’s (1998) comparison of coefficients formula.10 This equation reduces
the bias produced when comparing coefficients across models.
In the first results chapter, I begin by examining the main effects of race/ethnicity,
sex, and age on sentencing outcomes. This technique speaks to the effects of
race/ethnicity, sex, and age on sentencing decisions, net of controls, such as criminal
history and offense severity. In a second set of analyses, I examine the joint effects
race/ethnicity and sex, and separately control for age. This will speak to differences in
race/ethnicity-sex combinations, which may be masked by examining each characteristic
independently. In the final set of analyses, I examine the joint effects of race/ethnicity,
sex, and age together, which, again, speaks to the intersectional nature of these extralegal characteristics, and potentially reveals masked variation across groups. For
race/ethnicity, I include black and Hispanic offenders and treat whites as the reference
category. In terms of sex, I treat males as the reference category. I treat age as a
categorical variable, but when I examine the joint effects I create three categories: those
30 years of age or younger, those between 31 and 49 years of age, and those at least 50

10

The formula for Paternoster et. al (1998)’s test for equality of regression coefficients is
z=

b1  b2
SEb1 2  SEb 2 2

68

years of age. In these models I also control for other case-level variables, as well as the
sentencing district in the interest of consistency.
In the second results chapter I leave level-1 variables as controls (although the
race/ethnicity, sex, and age variables are treated as main effects, not jointly), but also
include the district-level variables. I run separate models for each set of variables (e.g.,
political, community, and administrative) and an additional model where I include them
all together. This strategy allows me to estimate the effects of aggregate-level, contextual
variables, net of individual-level controls. I conduct these analyses pre- and post-Booker
separately for each independent variable, which allows me to see if the effect sizes vary
across time period.
In the final results chapter, I introduce cross-level interactions, focusing on the
interaction between race/ethnicity at level-1 and certain district-level variables at level2.11 I include two cross-level interactions in each model. In the first model, I estimate a
cross-level interaction between black offenders and district-level percent voting
Republican as well as one for Hispanic offenders and percent Republican. In the second
model, I include an interaction between black offenders and percentage of blacks in the
district as well as one between Hispanic offenders and immigrant concentration scores at
the district-level. Next, I include interactions between black offenders and caseload, as
well as Hispanic offenders and caseload. Finally, I examine interactions between
offender’s sex and aggregate female labor force participation. I estimate the models preand post-Booker, and for each of the three dependent variables. These techniques allow
me to estimate the extent to which race/ethnicity and gender effects are conditioned by

11

I grand-mean center all of the non-standardized level-2 variables to assist with interpretation of the
interaction terms.
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social contextual variables. As in the previous social context chapter, I run models for
each set of interactions. In all models, I also control for sentencing year by including a
set of dummy variables (not shown in tables). This accounts for non-independence
across sentencing year.
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Chapter 5: RACE/ETHNICITY, SEX, AND AGE RESULTS
Results from the main effects models for race/ethnicity (Hypothesis 1), sex
(Hypothesis 3), and age (Hypothesis 5) are presented in Table 5.1. Results offer support
for the hypotheses that non-whites, males, and younger offenders receive more punitive
sentencing outcomes than whites, females, and older offenders. More specifically, results
yielded greater odds of incarceration for blacks (b = .176), Hispanics (b = .387), and
younger offenders (b = .262). Conversely, they yielded lower odds of incarceration for
females (b = -.242). Similarly, results from sentence length models suggest that blacks (b
= .028) and Hispanics (b = .044) receive longer sentences than whites, females receive
shorter sentences than males (b = -.234), and younger offenders receive longer sentences
(b = .014). Again, these results provide support for Hypotheses 1, 3, and 5.
I am also interested in how sentencing practices have changed as a function of the
Booker decision, so Hypotheses 2, 4, and 6 address whether extra-legal effects (e.g.,
race/ethnicity, sex, age) are stronger after the Booker decision. My hypotheses suggest
that they will be, because Booker shifts discretionary power back to judges. Coefficient
comparison tests to examine these hypotheses are presented in Table 5.4.
Specifically, Hypothesis 2 suggests that race/ethnicity effects will be stronger in
the post-Booker era. Models in Table 5.4 provide strong, but not complete support for
this hypothesis. While the odds of incarceration for blacks in the post-Booker era are not
significantly different from those in the pre-Booker period (z = -.09)12, the odds for
Hispanic offenders are (z = -2.35) by about 22%. For sentence length, the effect sizes are

12

These z-scores test the null hypothesis that there is no difference in effect sizes across time period.
Scores greater than 1.96 or less than -1.96 suggest that the null hypothesis should be rejected, and there is
indeed a statistically significant difference in effect sizes across time period.
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stronger in the post-Booker period for both black offenders by about 2% (z = -6.00) and
Hispanic offenders by about 4% (z = -6.56), providing support for Hypothesis 2.
Hypothesis 4 suggests that the sex effect will be stronger after the Booker
decision. In terms of both odds of incarceration, this appears to be the case. While
females yield odds of incarceration smaller than those yielded by males in the pre-Booker
era, the difference is even greater after the Booker decision (z = .251). Conversely,
Hypothesis 4 is not supported for the sentence length outcome, as the benefit enjoyed by
female offenders relative to male offenders actually diminishes post-Booker (z = -2.03),
although that difference is statistically significant, just not in the expected direction.
Hypothesis 6 posits that the age effect will be stronger after the Booker decision.
This hypothesis receives weak support. For the incarceration decision, the difference in
the effect sizes of the age variables are not at all statistically significant (z = 1.81 and
1.14 respectively). For the sentence length outcomes, young offenders are treated more
punitively after Booker (z = -3.54), but there is not statistically significant difference for
older offenders, thus Hypothesis 6 receives weak support.
Models in Tables 5.2 and 5.3 explore the interactive relationships between
race/ethnicity, sex, age, and sentencing outcomes. Hypothesis 7 posits that non-white
males will receive harsher sentences than other race/ethnicity-sex combinations, and net
of controls, results provide support for that both in terms of the incarceration decision and
sentencing length. Black males yield 28% greater odds of incarceration than white males
(b = .249), and Hispanic males yield odds that are 71% greater (b = .534). Moreover, for
sentencing length, the sentences given to black males are four percent longer than those
given to white males (b = .039), and also four percent longer for Hispanic males (b =
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.038). Interestingly, when it comes to sentence length, Hispanic females receive the
harshest sanctions of all, as their sentences are, on average, 8% longer than those given to
white males (b = .077). Thus, in terms of the incarceration decision, Hypothesis 4
receives support, but it is only partially supported for sentence length because of this
finding regarding Hispanic females.
Similarly, Hypothesis 8 suggests that young, non-white males will receive more
punitive sanctions than other race/ethnicity-sex-age combinations. In terms of the in/out
decision, the hypothesis is supported, as young black males yield odds of incarceration
71% higher than the reference category (white males, 31-49), and young Hispanic males
yield odds 85% higher (b = .614). Again, however, young Hispanic females receive the
most punitive responses when it comes to sentencing, with sentences 12% longer than the
reference category. Once again, the hypothesis is supported for the in/out decision, but
not necessarily for the sentence length decision.
The remaining hypotheses examine whether multiplicative effects vary across
time period and are presented in Tables 5.5 and 5.6. Hypothesis 9 suggests that the effect
of being a non-white male will be stronger after the Booker decision. This hypothesis is
not supported for the incarceration decision (z = -.89 and -.74), but it is supported for the
sentence length decision, as black males (z = -5.30) and Hispanic males (z = -4.53) each
receive more punitive sentences after Booker than they did before.
Finally, Hypothesis 10 suggests that the effect of being a young, non-white male
will be stronger following the Booker decision. Results appear in Table 5.6. Once again,
models predicting odds of incarceration did not support this hypothesis for young, black
males (z = .17) or young, Hispanic males (z = -.20). Conversely, models estimating
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sentence length were supportive of the hypothesis both for young, black males (z = -6.53)
and young Hispanic males (z = -2.81). Thus, Hypothesis 10 is supported for the sentence
length outcome, but not the incarceration decision outcome.

Discussion of Results
Taken together, these results are consistent with some of the prior literature on
sentencing outcomes. For example, Steffensmeier et al. (1993; 1998) suggest that young,
non-white males are seen as a “dangerous” class. Under conditions where judges have
more flexibility to sentence as they see appropriate (e.g., the post-Booker era), outcomes
are likely to reflect a penalty which is applied to those who fit this type. As noted before,
since judges operate without complete information, they rely on patterned responses
(perceptual shorthands) to create proximate measures of blameworthiness, danger and
practical concerns (Albonetti, 1991; Steffensmeier et al., 1998). More often than not,
these shorthands are to the detriment of young, non-white, male offenders, and this is
amplified in the post-Booker period.
More specifically, these results seem to reflect some of what has been found in
the prior research with respect to the Booker decision. For example, Ulmer et al. (2011a)
and the 2010 United States Sentencing Commission report found that black male
offenders are subject to greater disparity in sentencing outcomes post-Booker, at least
relative to the PROTECT era (2002-2005). My results seem to reflect that as well, at
least with respect to sentence length decision. However, like Ulmer et al., I did not find
evidence of changes to odds of incarceration for black males in the post-Booker period.
Taken together, the discretion awarded by the Booker decision seems to work to the
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disadvantage of black male offenders, at least relative to the PROTECT era, but perhaps
even more generally than that.
This study differs from previous research on Booker because it prioritizes the role
of intersectionality on sentencing disparity. While previous research may examine
disparity across district, this research shows that it is important to look across the various
layers of extra-legal variables. As I have argued, it is not enough to look at
race/ethnicity, gender, and age in an additive, independent way. Instead, these
characteristics interact with each other, and if research ignores this, they will fail to
uncover some of the nuances of how these characteristics may influence sentencing.
For example, one of the key findings in this chapter was that young, Hispanic
females receive the most punitive sanctions of all. In some ways this is unexpected,
given previous literature on sentencing outcomes (Steffensmeier et al., 1993; 1998).
After all, female offenders are generally provided some degree chivalry at the sentencing
stage. It seems that this chivalry does not extend across racial and ethnic groups. It is
possible that Hispanic females are more likely to associate with Hispanic male drug
offenders, and when given the option to trade information on their associates for a
mitigated sentence, their loyalty to associates prevents them from doing so (see Pasko,
2002).13 While my data lack the sophistication to explicitly speak on this possibility, this
is certainly something to examine in the future. Additionally, the Booker decision, as
well as decisions which followed (e.g., Gall and Kimbrough) focused explicitly on the
sentences that African American offenders received for crack cocaine offenses, which
makes Hispanic females less of a focus.
13

After all, one of the most important avenues for downward departures in the pre-Booker era was 5K1
Substantial Assistance Departures, which provide for a mitigated sentence in exchange for information that
could lead to the conviction of another offender.
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To further understand the processes at work here, it is important that future
research contain information that was not available in this study. In particular, it would
prove useful to collect data on individual judges. It is reasonable to think that extra-legal
characteristics (e.g., race/ethnicity, sex, age) may interact with extra-judicial
characteristics (e.g., race/ethnicity, sex, and tenure of judges). Non-white judges could
potentially be more sympathetic and/or supportive toward non-white offenders. This is
something that has been shown in the policing literature, where African American
officers are more supportive of African-American offenders in disadvantaged
neighborhoods (see Brooks, 2010).
There were also differences across time period. In many cases, the effect sizes
were stronger after the Booker decision, largely to the detriment of non-white offenders,
male offenders, and younger offenders (Hypotheses 1-3). The Booker decision represents
a moment in time where Federal guidelines were no longer mandatory. This allows
judges to exercise more discretion, and in some way, seems that they apply more
importance to perceptual shorthands in the post-Booker period by sentencing non-white,
male, younger offenders more punitively than before.
In sum, it seems clear that extra-legal variables play a significant role in
sentencing outcomes, and the role is enhanced in contexts where more discretion is
available to judges. The extent to which these patterns are contextual is something that is
not clear from the current literature. Thus, I will attempt to address this in the following
results chapters.
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Chapter 6: SOCIAL CONTEXT RESULTS
The results in this chapter test Hypotheses 11-18, which refer to social context
effects. I begin by examining the proportion of the variation in sentencing outcomes that
is explained at the district level. An intercept-only model is presented in Table 6.1.
Using this model, I calculate an intra-class correlation (ICC), which illustrates the
proportion of variation in the dependent variable (e.g., sentence length) explained by
level 2 (e.g., district) without any other independent variables in the model. The ICC for
the totality of cases is .16, suggesting that 16 percent of the variation in sentence length is
explained at the district level. While this proportion is modest, it is more than has
typically been found in the sentencing literature, where most of the variation in
sentencing outcomes is attributed to individual or case-level predictors (see Feldmeyer &
Ulmer, 2011; Kautt, 2002; Ulmer & Johnson, 2004). The ICC for pre-Booker sentences
is also .16, while it is .18 for post-Booker sentences. This suggests that it is a worthwhile
endeavor to examine level-2 units to understand variation in sentencing outcomes.
For the remainder of this chapter, I will test the hypotheses presented in Chapter
3. Results from district-level models are presented in Table 6.2. Hypotheses 11 suggests
that offenders sentenced in more politically conservative climates, on average, receive
more punitive sanctions. These results fail to provide support in terms of the in/out
decision, where none of the political variables reach statistical significance, but they do
provide some support for the sentence length outcomes. Specifically, offenders
sentenced in districts with a greater Republican vote can expect longer sentences (b =
.003). Conversely, offenders sentenced in districts with a larger proportion of the
population voting can expect more lenient sanctions (b = -.005). Thus, these results
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provide support for Hypothesis 11 in terms of sentence length, but not the incarceration
decision.
I also predict that aggregate-level effects will vary across time period. Hypothesis
12 predicts that offenders sentenced in districts with more conservative political climates
receive more punitive sanctions in the post-Booker period than they did before the
decision. Tests for this hypothesis appear in Table 6.3. Regardless of sentencing
outcome, none of the effect sizes of the political variables vary significantly across time
period, as none of the z-scores reach statistical significance. This means that Hypothesis
12 is not supported.
Hypothesis 13 suggests that offenders sentenced in districts with larger black
populations and greater levels of immigrant concentration are likely to receive harsher
sentences. The only variable that achieved statistical significance in the in/out decision
model was disadvantage, which most likely serves as an indirect indicator of economic
threat. Still, the effect was such that offenders sentenced in districts with higher levels of
disadvantage yielded greater odds of incarceration (b = .169). In terms of sentence
length, only white/Hispanic income inequality reaches statistical significance (b = -.145)
and the effect suggested that sentences were actually more lenient in districts with more
income inequality. These results provide only weak support for Hypothesis 13.14
Hypothesis 14 suggests that offenders sentenced in districts with more racial and
ethnic threat will receive harsher penalties after Booker than before. Results from this
hypothesis are presented in Table 6.4. Results indicate that there is no statistically
significant difference in effects across time period, so Hypothesis 14 is not supported.
14

I also tested for a possible quadratic relationship for percent black. The quadratic term failed to reach
statistical significance in any model, so the regression with the linear term is presented in the interest of
simplicity.
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Hypothesis 15 posits that offenders sentenced in districts with higher rates of
female labor force participation receive more lenient sentences. Results indicate that
female labor force participation did not influence sentencing outcomes in a meaningful
way either for the in/out decision, or sentence length. Thus, Hypothesis 15 is not
supported.
Hypothesis 16 predicts that offenders sentenced in districts with more female
labor force participation will receive more lenient sanctions in the post-Booker period.
Results from these hypothesis tests are presented in Table 6.4, and the z-scores do not
yield a statistically significant difference across time period. Hypothesis 16 is not
supported.
Finally, with respect to administrative variables, Hypothesis 17 suggests that
offenders sentenced in districts with higher caseloads would receive more lenient
sentences. None of the administrative variables, including caseload, were significant in
the in/out model, and only district-mean offense severity (b = .019) and percentage of
violent cases (b = -.016) were significant in the sentence length model. Hypothesis 17
does not receive support. So far, results indicate, as does the majority of previous
research, that most of the “action” in sentencing outcomes occurs at level 1, not level 2.
Hypothesis 18 posits that offenders sentenced in districts with higher caseloads
are likely to benefit from more leniency following Booker. Once again, none of these
differences reach statistical significance, meaning that Hypothesis 18 is not supported
(see Table 6.5). In sum, the hypotheses that suggest that the effects of social contextual
variables vary across time period are all rejected.
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Discussion of Results
Taken together, it appears that aggregate-level variables are not nearly as
influential on sentencing outcomes as case-level factors, and their effects do not vary
significantly across time period. This stands to reason, and one would hope that sentence
outcomes would rely primarily on the behavior and characteristics of offenders. The
factors at the forefront of both judicial and prosecutorial decision making are
characteristics of the offender – race/ethnicity, age, criminal history, and so on.
Aggregate-level factors are unlikely to factor directly into the decision-making process,
so it is not all that surprising that the effects found here are weak or null. It seems that
when Booker caused the Guidelines to shift from mandatory to advisory, the effect of
aggregate-level contextual variables did not increase. These findings are not altogether
different from those found in other studies of Federal sentencing outcomes that examine
contextual effects (see Feldmeyer & Ulmer, 2011). Still, it is reasonable to think that
social factors could, at the very least, contextualize some of those individual-level
variables. However, analyzing contextual effects on Federal sentencing outcomes brings
with it a number of limitations.
First and foremost is the unit of analysis problem. The unit of analysis for level 2,
aggregate variables in this study is the Federal sentencing district. Unfortunately, many
of the aggregate predictors that I used in this analysis do not lend themselves to such
units. All of the variables drawn from the Census are taken at the county level and then
aggregated up into districts. Since many of the districts cover large amounts of space,
and sometimes an entire state, these variables are much less telling than they might be at
a smaller unit of analysis, such as the tract-level. For example, a variable such as
disadvantage is aggregated for the entire district. This means that concentrated levels of
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disadvantage will be mitigated by areas of relatively low disadvantage to produce a
middle ground. It might not make sense to assume that disadvantage that lives in a
certain pocket of a district would affect sentencing outcomes throughout the entire
district.
Second, one of the most important contextual effects may be inter-judicial
disparity. While I am able to include data on offender-level data, I do not have any
information on sentencing judges. To the extent that within-district variation might exist,
a large proportion of it may be explained by characteristics of judges. Unfortunately,
such information was not available to me for this study.
Finally, I am unable to account for a number of aggregate-level focal concerns,
particularly those most closely related to practical constraints. I do not have information
on things like prison space, resources for health care in prisons, and so on, and even with
that information, it is not clear that it would be of much use at the district-level. These
are the types of contextual variables that would seem to have a more explicit influence on
sentencing outcomes, though.
In sum, it is clear that contextual variables have some effect on sentencing
outcomes, but compared to individual-level variables, those effects are limited. Still, it is
important to account for them to understand how they can influence the dynamics of
other extra-legal factors. In the next chapter, I will more closely examine how contextual
variables may condition the effects of individual-level variables by exploring cross-level
interactions.
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Chapter 7: CROSS-LEVEL INTERACTION RESULTS
In this chapter, I examine cross-level interactions. That is, I test whether the
effects of certain case-level variables are conditional upon certain district-level variables.
As in the previous analysis, I run models for all of the cases, as well as pre- and postBooker models so that I can evaluate whether the effect sizes vary across time period.
Case-level and district-level controls are included in all models. I examine two
dependent variables: the in/out decision and sentence length.
My argument in this chapter is that social context variables condition the effects
of race/ethnicity on sentencing outcomes. That is, an offender’s race/ethnicity is likely to
influence an offender’s sentence based on social characteristics of the district where they
were sentenced, which may include political climate, racial/ethnic composition, or
administrative factors. These results are presented in Table 7.1.
Hypothesis 19 suggests that non-whites sentenced in more politically conservative
districts can expect especially severe sentences relative to white offenders. To test this
hypothesis, I use the measure of percent of the district voting Republican to capture
political conservatism. Results indicate that for the in/out decision, Hispanic offenders
yield greater odds of incarceration if they are sentenced in more conservative districts (b
= .021), and the same is true for black offenders, where being sentenced in a highly
conservative district seems to increase odds of incarceration (b = .184). In terms of
sentence length, conservative districts decrease sentences for black offenders (b = -.003),
but there is no statistically significant link for Hispanic offenders. Figure 7.1 shows that
sentences are more punitive for blacks until the percent voting Republican reaches about
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62%, which actually runs counter to Hypothesis 19.15 After that point, non-black
offenders are actually sentenced more harshly. Conversely, Figure 7.2 shows that
sentences between Hispanics and non-Hispanics run largely parallel through the
distribution of percent voting Republican, but starts to diverge (with Hispanic offenders
receiving more punitive sentences) at the high end of the distribution. Hypothesis 19 is
only weakly supported.
Hypothesis 20 compares effect sizes of the interaction term between political
conservatism and race/ethnicity of the offender, suggesting that the effect of being nonwhite in a politically conservative district will produce especially severe sentences
outcomes after Booker. Results are presented in Table 7.2. The z-scores for the
comparisons for both the in/out decision and sentence length outcomes fail to reach
statistical significance; therefore Hypothesis 20 is not supported.
Hypothesis 21 posits that non-white offenders sentenced in districts with larger
non-white populations and more ethnic threat can expect particularly severe sentences
relative to whites, where ethnic threat is measured with the immigrant concentration
index. Models predicting odds of incarceration were not supportive of this hypothesis,
and the interaction between black offenders and percent black failed to reach statistical
significance, and the interaction between Hispanic offenders and immigrant concentration
was significant, and showed that Hispanic offenders sentenced in districts were greater
levels of ethnic threat are sentenced with more leniency (b = -.039). For sentence length,
the interaction between black offenders and percent black (b = .001) is statistically

15

Figures graph main effects and product terms and hold all other covariates, including the intercept, at 0.
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significant and supports Hypothesis 2116. Likewise, Hispanic offenders sentenced in
districts with higher levels of immigrant concentration receive less punitive sentences (b
= .008, Figure 7.4), which is also supportive of Hypothesis 21. Figure 7.4 also shows
that Hispanics and non-Hispanics alike are actually sentenced with more leniency where
immigrant concentration is more prominent. Thus, Hypothesis 21 is supported for the
sentence length outcome for black offenders in districts with a higher proportion of black
residents, but not for Hispanics.
Hypothesis 22 suggests that non-white offenders sentenced in districts with
greater levels of racial (percent black) and ethnic threat (immigrant concentration)
receive even more severe sentences after Booker. Results are presented in Table 7.3. For
the models estimating in/out decision, the only statistically significant difference across
time period is for the interaction between Hispanic offenders and immigrant
concentration (z = 3.16). For the sentence length models, the interaction between black
offenders and percent black (z = -2.77) yielded a statistically significant difference, but
the other interaction terms did not. Thus, Hypothesis 22 is partially supported for both
outcomes.
Hypothesis 23 predicts that non-white offenders sentenced in districts with higher
caseloads can expect more punitive sanctions. This was not the case for the in/out
decision, as the interactions between black offenders and caseload and Hispanic offenders
and caseload were both non-significant. Conversely, for sentence length, both the
interaction between black offenders and caseload (b = .014, Figure 7.6) and Hispanic
offenders and caseload (b = .030, Figure 7.7) were statistically significant. Somewhat
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While the interaction is statistically significant, the effect size is rather small, indicated by the graph in
Figure 7.3.
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surprisingly, as both Figures 7.6 and 7.7 indicate, non-Blacks and non-Hispanics
(respectively) received less punitive sanctions, but sentences for everyone seemed to
increase with caseload. Therefore, the data does not support Hypothesis 23 for the
sentence length outcome or the incarceration decision.
Hypothesis 24 posits that non-white offenders sentenced in districts with heavier
caseloads receive even more severe sentences following Booker. Results for this
hypothesis are presented in Table 7.4. Results indicate that the interactions between
black offenders and caseload are not statistically significant for either outcome, however,
the interactions between Hispanic offenders and caseload are significant for both the
in/out decision (z = 3.35) and sentence length (z = 2.00). Hypothesis 24 is supported for
the interaction involving Hispanic, but not black offenders.
Hypothesis 25 posits that females sentenced in districts with more female labor
force participation can expect particularly lenient sentences. Results are presented in
Table 14 and they indicate that consistent to the hypothesis, odds of incarceration are
greater for females sentenced in districts with higher rates of female labor force
participation (b = .040). Conversely, the hypothesis is not supported for the sentence
length outcome (b = -.007, Figure 7.5). Figure 7.5 indicates that sentences across the
board are less punitive as female labor force participation increases, but also that the
gender gap converges at high levels of female labor force participation. Thus,
Hypothesis 22 receives support in terms of both odds of incarceration and sentence
length.
Finally, Hypothesis 26 argues that female offenders sentenced in districts with
more female labor force participation receive even more lenient sanctions following
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Booker. Results are presented in Table 7.3. These results indicate that the interaction
between female offenders and female labor force participation is not statistically
significant for either the incarceration decision (z = .063) or the sentence length decision
(z = -.044), thus Hypothesis 26 is not supported.

Discussion of Results
As discussed earlier, some of the results from this chapter ran counter to
expectations. While I found that all sentences were more punitive in districts with higher
levels of Republican vote, at the highest levels, black offenders received less punitive
sanctions than other offenders. For Hispanics and non-Hispanics, the trends are similar
(e.g., sentences are increasingly punitive with rising levels of Republican vote), with
Hispanics receiving, on average, slightly more punitive sanctions. I expected that
Hispanics would receive a harsher penalty in conservative districts.
The finding that black offenders would receive more lenient sanctions in
particularly conservative districts runs quite counter to expectations and is something that
deserves more attention. This finding could be a function of regional variation, where the
size and form may vary across geographical location. While my analysis does control for
sentencing district, it does not compare districts in the South to districts in the Northeast,
or the West, or the Midwest. Perhaps analysis nuanced in this way could shed some light
on this unexpected finding.
In terms of threat variables, I found that minority-group status for blacks but not
Hispanics acted as an aggravator when paired with district-level threat variables, although
the effect size was quite small. This is partially consistent with Blalock’s predictions that
social controls will tighten against members of threatening groups, especially as the
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group numbers increase. Indeed, all offenders seem to receive more lenient sanctions in
districts with higher scores on the immigrant concentration measure (Figure 7.4),
suggesting that it may actually be a protective factor (see Sampson, 2006). More
specifically, Sampson argues that the presence of immigrant population has a tendency to
actually reduce crime. In the same way, such presence may also mitigate the severity of
criminal sentences handed down to minority-group members. While my measures do not
necessarily indicate growing population size, they do suggest that social controls are
tighter where these populations are most concentrated.
Finally, the administrative variables acted as expected, where minority-group
offenders sentenced in districts with heavier caseloads received more punitive sanctions
(Figures 7.6 and 7.7). Across the board, offenders may expect more punitive sanctions in
districts where caseload pressures are high. This is consistent with the focal concerns
perspective, where practical constraints are a way to work through the workload. The
focal concerns perspective would likely expect minority-group members to receive more
punitive sanctions in over-worked districts, and as such racial/ethnic status would be
treated as a proxy for blameworthiness and/or danger to the community. My results
support this.
There are some limitations associated with the data. As discussed in the previous
chapter, census variables are aggregated up to the district-level, which is an imperfect
measure of things like political climate and threat. Such large aggregations of data tend
to mask pockets of concentration. For example, political climate may vary across county,
but when those counties are aggregated into a single unit, such variation is invisible.
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Unfortunately, since Federal cases are handled at the district-level, there is not a clean
solution to this unit of analysis problem.
Also problematic is the constraining race/ethnicity categories. It is generally not
enough to lump all black, or especially all Hispanic offenders together. More inclusive
categories (e.g., Haitian, Puerto Rican, Cuban, and so on) would likely be more telling,
but at the same time, introduce added complexity to statistical models. Often,
criminological research must choose between complexity and parsimony, and this
research errs on the side of parsimony.
Taken together, the results from this chapter suggest the necessity in examining
cross-level interactions. In each of the categories that I examined, district-level variables
conditioned individual-level effects. While the effects did not necessarily vary across
time period, it is still important to account for them, especially since such a result
suggests some sort of gravitational pull toward the guidelines presumptive sentences.
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Chapter 8: CONCLUSION
The goal of this dissertation was to, through the lens of the focal concerns
perspective (Steffensmeier et al., 1993; 1998), understand the influence of extra-legal
variables, at both the individual and aggregate levels, on sentencing outcomes, and how
those influences may have varied as a function of policy shifts (e.g., United States v.
Booker). I argue that it is not enough to examine effects in a straightforward way,
because the influences are not straightforward. Instead, they are nuanced, and
researchers have a responsibility to treat them that way. My research, like the research of
Ulmer et al. (2011a) broadens the scope of focal concerns by incorporating individualand aggregate-level extra-legal effects.
My dissertation research asks two broad questions: do extra-legal variables
influence sentencing outcomes, and if so, does the influence vary as a function of the
Booker decision? Overall, my results suggest that the answer to both questions is yes.
In terms of individual-level extra-legal characteristics, both main effect and interactive
models suggest that extra-legal variables influence sentencing outcomes, net of legally
relevant variables such as criminal history and offense severity. More specifically, the
data indicate that whites often receive more lenient sanctions than non-white offenders,
females receive more lenient ones than male offenders, and older offenders enjoy more
leniency than younger offenders. In terms of multiplicative effects, non-white males, on
average, received more punitive sanctions than other race/ethnicity-sex combinations.
Finally, in terms of race/ethnicity-sex-age combinations, young, non-white males often
received sanctions that were among the harshest of any group, but there were some
caveats. In general, these effects were amplified following the Booker decision, when
judges presumably had more discretion relative to the pre-Booker period.
89

One particularly interesting finding is that young Hispanic females received the
most punitive sanctions of any group, and this result persisted through rigorous
examination.17 It seems likely that drug offenses played a significant role in this finding,
but it can also relate back to focal concerns. Hispanic female offenders are generally
seen as loyal, and thus are less likely than black or white females to provide information
(on other offenders) which could result in a mitigated sentence (see Pasko, 2002).
Moreover, the types of drugs that Hispanic female offenders get involved with are likely
to vary from those associated with other groups (e.g., crack cocaine for blacks). In
essence, by resisting cooperation, judges may attribute more blameworthiness to young,
Hispanic, female offenders and thus respond to them more punitively. Future research is
necessary to better specify these processes, but the notion of loyalty seems entirely
plausible.
More generally, the results seem to echo what has been argued in the literature:
that non-white, young, males are at a disadvantage at the sentencing stage, and the
disadvantage reaches beyond criminal history and offense severity (Doerner & Demuth,
2010; Steffensmeier, 1993; 1998). Future research should continue to explore the
mechanisms where extra-legal disparity in sentences manifests itself, and how it can be
addressed.
It is also important to understand changes in sentencing disparity over time.
While my results suggest that the effects of extra-legal variables are amplified following
Booker, other studies (e.g., Ulmer et al., 2011b) suggest that racial disparity has not
increased as a function of Booker or decisions that follow (such as Gall). These

17

For example, I ran models excluding immigration offenses, and even isolating to narcotics offenses, but
the results did not seem to change.
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divergent findings could reflect variation in scope of the data, but other factors could be
at play as well. More research is needed to better understand the evolving role of
discretion in sentencing disparity.
Therefore, in some of the ways discussed above, my research supports the focal
concerns perspective. It seems clear that extra-legal variables (e.g., race/ethnicity,
gender, age) have some effect on sentencing outcomes net of legally-relevant variables
such of offense severity and criminal history. This becomes especially apparent when
one examines these extra-legal characteristics at the intersections (e.g., race/ethnicity,
gender, and age together rather than in isolation). Thus, the federal data examined here
seems to support the focal concerns perspective.
Aggregate-level variables seem to carry a lot less punch, but still produced some
interesting results. Although main effects of contextual variables on sentence outcomes
were minimal, a few variables yielded interesting results. For example, offenders
sentenced in districts with more support for Republican presidential candidates received
slightly more punitive sentences than offenders sentenced in other districts. Moreover,
sentences were, on average, longer for offenders sentenced in districts with high mean
offense levels. Even where I did find effects, they rarely varied across time period (e.g.,
pre- and post-Booker). My study is not the first to produce few linkages between
aggregate-level variables and individual-level sentencing outcomes (see Feldmeyer &
Ulmer, 2011, for example). Therefore, as suggested by Kramer & Ulmer (2008), focal
concerns at the individual level are, in some cases, influenced by aggregate-level
characteristics, but the most direct effect occurs at the individual level.
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Perhaps the cross-level interactions are even more interesting. It seems likely that
contextual variables could condition the effects of individual-level variables, rather than
exert direct effects over sentencing outcomes. Specifically, findings indicate that blacks
could expect more punitive sanctions in more conservative districts, while no such
interaction existed for Hispanics. Moreover, blacks are sentenced more harshly in
districts with larger black populations, Hispanics offenders are sentenced with more
leniency in districts with high levels of immigrant concentration, and while females are
sentenced more harshly in districts with higher levels of female labor force participation,
the gender gap is much larger in such districts than ones with lower levels of female labor
force participation. Finally, black and Hispanic offenders are both sentenced more
leniently in districts with higher caseloads.
Many of these findings conform to previous research. For example, the finding
that African American offenders are sentenced more punitively in politically conservative
environments is one that has been replicated across multiple studies (see Helms & Jacobs,
2002, for example). Moreover, the notion that blacks are punished more harshly in
places with greater levels of minority group threat was first argued by Blalock (1967), but
has been expanded since then. For example, Bontrager et al., (2005) find that black
offenders are punished more severely in places with more threat and Wu & De’Angelo
(2014) find that non-citizens are sentenced more harshly in districts with large noncitizen populations. Other studies find evidence of more punitive attitudes in general and
not specifically limited to minority group members (Britt, 2000; Myers & Talarico, 1987;
Stultz & Baumer, 2007). Future studies of Federal sentencing outcomes should
incorporate threat in more innovative ways, whenever possible.
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Conversely, I found evidence that Hispanic offenders (and all offenders,
generally) were sentenced with more leniency in districts with higher levels of immigrant
concentration. Research has suggested that immigration levels can actually serve as a
protective factor, especially in the case of first generation immigrants (Sampson, 2006;
Martinez et al., 2010). Future research should further explore this relationship with
respect to a variety of social responses to crime.
Results also suggested more lenient sanctions for non-white offenders in districts
with heavier caseloads. In such districts, non-white offenders may be encouraged by
their attorneys to engage in plea negotiations, and are thus not subject to “trial penalties”
(see Engen & Steen, 2000). Norms in such districts may also influence the sentencing of
non-white offenders, establishing “going rates” that judges are unlikely to deviate from
without good reason (Dixon, 1995). These findings may actually run counter to the focal
concerns perspective, but make more sense in terms of courtroom communities
(Eisenstein et al., 1988). Future research should more completely explore the role of
courtroom communities on Federal sentencing outcomes.
This study was not without limitations. As is often an issue with archival data,
the analysis was limited to variables available in the USSC database. It would have been
interesting to have access to information pertaining to judges. Because that type of
information was not available, I was not able to examine things like intra-district
variation across judges, which could be very telling. Moreover, information about
prosecutors and prosecutorial discretion could go a long way in illustrating concepts like
the hydraulic affect, and the specific ways in which prosecutors may have adapted to
changes in the structure of the Federal Guidelines over time. Finally, more information
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about offenders, such as a more detailed measure of criminal history, and other extralegal variables could say a lot about how discretion is or is not used in Federal
Sentencing.
Another measurement issue is specific to the contextual analyses – the use of the
district-level as a Level-2 measure. Districts are spatially large units which incorporate a
number of counties and often an entire state. Thus, some of the traditional aggregatelevel variables may not operate in the same way that might with a small unit of analysis.
Concepts such as racial segregation, political climate, and even threat may take on a
different meaning given the unit of analysis. Unfortunately, this seems to be an
irreconcilable issue when working with Federal Sentencing given the nature of Federal
Districts.
More specifically, my measures of racial and ethnic threat do not meet the level of
sophistication that some other studies of minority-group that have. As mentioned earlier,
some studies use measures such as civic participation, change over time, or race-specific
arrest rates. I use a more simplistic measure of non-white population size, as well as a
factor that includes language spoken at home, and percent foreign-born. These
differences represent both methodological choices and data availability. Moreover,
interpreting these measures at the district-level create some of the interpretation
difficulties discussed earlier.
Moreover, I do not have measures of either the hydraulic effect or policy changes
aside from Booker. The federal data do not contain many explicit measures of
prosecutorial discretion. Therefore, I am careful to discuss the hydraulic effect and how
the implementation and technical removal of the Federal Guidelines illustrates it, but did

94

not have a good way to actively measure it. Moreover, I do not control for some of the
state-level decisions that led up to Booker for a number of reasons. First, they are statelevel decisions and do not apply directly to federal-level decisions. Second, trying
Booker as a grouping variable allows me to more clearly test the hypotheses that
sentencing outcomes have changed following the landmark decision. I encourage
interested researchers to more closely examine some of these decisions in future research.
Finally, the present research only looks directly at sentencing outcomes, and does
not pay much attention to non-custodial sanctions. The processes, and nature of
discretion, could vary substantially for these types of sentences. After all, it seems
reasonable that discretion could play the greatest role for sanctions at the low-end of the
sentencing distribution. Future research should take care in examining not only custodial,
but also non-custodial sanctions.
In conclusion, this dissertation examines the influence of the United States v.
Booker decision on sentencing outcomes. The preceding analyses produce evidence of
variation across time period, but perhaps more important, they illustrate the notion of
extra-legal variables exerting considerable influences over sentencing outcomes net of
legally relevant characteristics such as criminal history and offense severity. Clearly,
policy can act as a filter for discretion. This is illustrated through the notion that extralegal variables, for the most part, played a more important role in explaining sentencing
outcomes under advisory guidelines than they did under mandatory ones. Overall, it
seems clear that judicial discretion (and moreover, discretion at large) plays a role in
sentencing decisions, and it is something that should not be overlooked.
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TABLES
Table 4.1 Descriptive Statistics for Case-Level Variables (Level 1).
Mean
Standard Minimum
Deviation
Dependent Variables
In/Out Decision
.51
.50
0
Sentence Length (Excluding Zero54.38
74.02
1
Month Sentences)
Sentence Length (Including Zero48.91
71.95
0
Month Sentences)
Independent Variables
Black
.25
.43
0
Hispanic
.44
.50
0
Female
.14
.35
0
Age
34.48
10.74
16
Criminal History
2.41
1.71
1
Offense Severity
18.51
8.88
0
Trial
.042
.201
0
Violent Offense
.01
.10
0
Drug Offense
.38
.48
0
Detainment Status
.64
.48
0
Education
3.74
1.64
0
Citizenship Status
.61
.49
0
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Maximum

1
470
470

1
1
1
103
6
53
1
1
1
1
8
1

Table 4.2. Descriptive Statistics for District-Level Variables (Level 2).
Mean
Standard Minimum
Deviation
Political Variables
Percent Republican
56.85
9.42
9.3
Republican Governor
.68
.46
0
Percent Voting
58.07
4.55
44.1
Border District
.42
.49
0
Economic Variables
Percent Black
8.91
10.28
.15
Immigrant
Concentration
Percent Hispanic
17.11
16.51
.53
Percent Speaking Other than
18.15
13.76
1.80
English
Language at Home
Percent Foreign Born
8.12
7.48
.38
Disadvantage
Percent Below Poverty Line
2.97
.95
1.21
Joblessness
31.24
3.10
22.67
Percent Female-Headed
16.32
3.7
9.18
Households
Lack of Professional Role
72.58
3.86
54.94
Models
White/Black Income Inequality
1.61
.28
1.06
White/Hispanic Income Inequality
1.33
.16
.97
Female Labor Force Participation
.449
.030
.385
Administrative
Variables
Mean District-Level Offense
18.48
2.17
14.18
Severity
Mean District-Level Criminal
2.42
.28
1.67
History
Percent Violent Offenses
1.03
1.40
.16
Percent Drug Offenses
37.37
9.07
19.13
Caseload
18883.28
17589.59
934
Control Variables
Violent Crime Rate
906.82
1913.53
0
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Maximum

77.47
1
71.7
1
60.01

49.46
46.71

28.18
5.67
40.57
41.20
79.17
2.78
2.35
.531

23.48
3.08
15.03
64.72
53572
9091.14

Table 5.1 Multi-Level Regression Results for Race/Ethnicity, Sex, and Age.
(N=674,328)
In/Out
Sentence
Decision
Length
Variable
Black
.176***
.028***
(.025)
(.003)
***
Hispanic
.378
.044***
(.030)
(.003)
***
Female
-.242
-.234***
(.022)
(.003)
***
Age 30 or younger
.262
.014***
(.021)
(.002)
***
Age 50 or older
-.311
-.049***
(.033)
(.003)
***
Criminal
.659
.169***
History
(.012)
(.007)
Offense
.150***
.118***
Severity
(.005)
(.001)
Trial
.519***
.247***
(.074)
(.005)
Violent Offense
.108
.085***
(.085)
(.010)
Drug Offense
.066*
-.055***
(.031)
(.002)
Detainment Status
1.918***
.448***
(.022)
(.003)
***
Education
-.066
-.016***
(.006)
(.001)
***
Citizenship Status
-1.499
.011***
(.027)
(.003)
***
Constant
-1.76
.343***
(.087)
(.015)
* p <.05; ** p <.01; *** p <.001
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Table 5.2 Race/Ethnicity-Sex Multi-Level Regression Results (N = 674, 382)
In/Out
Sentence
Decision
Length
Variable
White Female
.033
-.221***
(.031)
(.004)
Black Male
.249***
.039***
(.029)
(.003)
Black Female
-.011
-.245***
(.035)
(.005)
***
Hispanic Male
.534
.038***
(.032)
(.003)
*
Hispanic
-.121
.077***
Female
(.047)
(.006)
***
Age 30 or younger
.254
.014***
(.020)
(.002)
***
Age 50 or older
-.312
-.049***
(.032)
(.003)
Criminal
.656***
.168***
History
(.011)
(.001)
Offense
.152***
.119***
Severity
(.005)
(.001)
Trial
.554***
.245***
(.071)
(.005)
Violent Offense
.114
.077***
(.082)
(.009)
Drug Offense
.090**
-.063***
(.030)
(.002)
***
Detainment Status
1.930
.453***
(.021)
(.002)
***
Education
-.061
-.016***
(.006)
(.001)
***
Citizenship Status
-1.484
.011***
(.026)
(.003)
***
Constant
-1.881
.333***
(.085)
(.015)
* p <.05; ** p <.01; *** p <.001
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Table 5.3 Race/Ethnicity-Sex-Age Multi-Level Regression Results (N = 674,382)
In/Out
Sentencing
Decision
Length
Variable
Young White Male
.157***
.011**
(.036)
(.004)
Young Black Male
.538***
.084***
(.041)
(.004)
***
Young Hispanic Male
.614
.035***
(.044)
(.004)
***
Young White Female
.286
-.267***
(.047)
(.007)
***
Young Black Female
.279
-.275***
(.047)
(.007)
*
Young Hispanic Female
-.176
.109***
(.068)
(.009)
***
Black Male, 31-49
.178
.012**
(.040)
(.004)
Hispanic Male, 31-49
.505***
.042***
(.040)
(.004)
White Female, 31-49
.044
-.189***
(.043)
(.006)
Black Female, 31-49
-.070
-.207***
(.050)
(.007)
Hispanic Female, 31-49
-.101
.066***
(.066)
(.009)
Older White Male
-.205***
-.044***
(.045)
(.005)
Older Black Male
-.138
-.057***
(.085)
(.009)
**
Older Hispanic Male
.253
.050***
(.091)
(.008)
***
Older White Female
-.522
-.235***
(.087)
(.011)
***
Older Black Female
-.530
-.266***
(.128)
(.017)
Older Hispanic Female
-.054
.073***
(.169)
(.021)
Constant
-1.843***
.333***
(.085)
(.015)
NOTE: Control Variables Not Shown
* p <.05; ** p <.01; *** p <.001
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Table 5.4 Pre- and Post-Booker Comparison of Main Effect Multi-Level Regression Results.
In/Out Decision
Sentence Length
Pre-Booker
Post-Booker
ZPre-Booker
Post-Booker
(N=398,780)
(N=275,602)
Score
(N=398,780)
(N=275,602)
Variable
Black
.179***
.184***
-.09
.018***
.048***
(.030)
(.045)
(.003)
(.004)
Hispanic
.321***
.468***
-2.35**
.030***
.072***
(.036)
(.051)
(.004)
(.005)
Female
-.200***
-.317***
2.51**
-.238***
-.225***
(.027)
(.038)
(.004)
(.005)
Age 30 or younger
.291***
.210***
1.81
.008**
.023***
(.025)
(.037)
(.003)
(.003)
Age 50 or older
-.280***
-.359***
1.14
-.044***
-.054***
(.041)
(.056)
(.005)
(.005)
Criminal History
.657***
.672***
.170***
.167***
(.015)
(.021)
(.001)
(.001)
Offense Severity
.158***
.127***
.118***
.118***
(.006)
(.008)
(.001)
(.001)
Trial
.503***
.566***
.263***
.224***
(.092)
(.128)
(.006)
(.007)
Violent Offense
.169
-.022
.115***
.039*
(.097)
(.176)
(.012)
(.015)
Drug Offense
.088*
.113*
-.037***
-.080***
(.038)
(.057)
(.003)
(.004)
Detainment Status
1.979***
1.828***
.434***
.471***
(.028)
(.037)
(.003)
(.004)
Education
-.055***
-.090***
-.017***
-.012***
(.008)
(.011)
(.001)
(.001)
Citizenship Status
-1.390***
-.1703***
.009*
.016***
(.034)
(.047)
(.004)
(.004)
Constant
-1.935***
-1.359***
.389***
.295***
(.110)
(.123)
(.016)
(.017)
NOTE: Control Variables Not Shown
* p <.05; ** p <.01; *** p <.001
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Z-Score
-6.00***
-6.56***
-2.03*
-3.54***
1.41

Table 5.5 Pre- and Post-Booker Comparison of Race/Ethnicity-Sex Multi-Level Regression Results.
In/Out Decision
Sentence Length
Pre-Booker
Post-Booker
Z-Score
Pre-Booker
Post-Booker
(N=398,780)
(N=275,602)
(N=398,780)
(N=275,602)
Variable
White Female
.078*
.054
.36
-.226***
-.213***
(.038)
(.055)
(.005)
(.007)
Black Male
.237***
.292***
-.89
.028***
.058***
(.036)
(.050)
(.004)
(.004)
Black Female
.080
-.178**
3.41***
-.244***
-.242***
(.042)
(.063)
(.006)
(.008)
Hispanic
.516***
.565***
-.74
.029***
.058***
Male
(.040)
(.053)
(.004)
(.005)
Hispanic Female
-.252***
.095
-3.50***
.060***
.105***
(.061)
(.078)
(.008)
(.009)
Age 30 or younger
.278***
.217***
.007**
.023***
(.025)
(.035)
(.003)
(.003)
Age 50 or older
-.271***
-.371***
-.042***
-.057***
(.040)
(.052)
(.005)
(.005)
Criminal History
.658***
.662***
.170***
.167***
(.014)
(.019)
(.001)
(.001)
Offense Severity
.160***
.132***
.119***
.119***
(.006)
(.008)
(.001)
(.001)
Trial
.51***
.636***
.261***
.225***
(.090)
(.119)
(.006)
(.007)
Violent Offense
.166
.010
.108***
.034*
(.096)
(.162)
(.012)
(.014)
Drug Offense
.093*
.161**
-.042***
-.089***
(.038)
(.053)
(.003)
(.003)
Detainment Status
1.981***
1.863***
.438***
.476***
(.027)
(.035)
(.003)
(.004)
Education
-.049***
-.083***
-.017***
-.014***
(.008)
(.010)
(.001)
(.001)
Citizenship Status
-1.376***
-1.678***
.010**
.014**
(.033)
(.044)
(.004)
(.004)
Constant
-2.075***
-1.501***
.374***
.298***
(.107)
(.117)
(.016)
(.017)
* p <.05; ** p <.01; *** p <.001
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Z-Score

-1.51
-5.30***
-.2
-4.53***
-3.74***

Table 5.6 Comparison of Pre- and Post-Booker Multi-Level Regression Results of Race/Ethnicity-Sex-Age
Regression Results.
In/Out Decision
Sentence Length
Pre-Booker
Post-Booker
ZPre-Booker
Post-Booker
Z(N=398,780)
(N=275,602)
Score
(N=398,780)
(N=275,602)
Score
Variable
Young White Male
.189***
.111
1.00
.005
.018**
-.166
(.044)
(.064)
(.005)
(.006)
Young Black Male
.553***
.538***
.17
.065***
.116***
-6.53***
(.049)
(.073)
(.005)
(.006)
Young Hispanic Male
.607***
.626***
-.20
.029***
.051***
-2.81***
(.054)
(.076)
(.005)
(.006)
Young White Female
.348***
.161
1.83
-.289***
-.232***
-4.01***
(.057)
(.085)
(.009)
(.011)
Young Black Female
.383***
.052
3.15***
-.286***
-.252***
-2.26*
(.056)
(.089)
(.009)
(.012)
Young Hispanic
-.267**
.008
-1.92
.107***
.113***
-.33
Female
(.086)
(.115)
(.012)
(.014)
Black Male, 31-49
.169**
.214**
-.53
.001
.032***
-3.97***
(.050)
(.068)
(.005)
(.006)
Hispanic Male, 31-49
.468***
.554***
-1.02
.030***
.064***
-4.35***
(.051)
(.067)
(.005)
(.006)
White Female, 31-49
.101
-.062
1.79
-.192***
-.185***
-.61
(.053)
(.074)
(.007)
(.009)
Black Female, 31-49
.039
-.232**
2.59***
-.200***
-.215***
1.06
(.061)
(.085)
(.009)
(.011)
Hispanic Female, 31-.268**
.148
-3.02***
.047***
.096***
-2.87***
49
(.087)
(.107)
(.011)
(.013)
Older White Male
-.133*
-.344***
2.23*
-.037***
-.051***
1.52
(.055)
(.077)
(.006)
(.007)
Older Black Male
-.141
-.113
-.16
-.057***
-.053***
-.23
(.110)
(.132)
(.012)
(.013)
Older Hispanic Male
.105
.492**
-2.06*
.033**
.080***
-2.89***
(.118)
(.146)
(.011)
(.012)
Older White Female
-.439***
-.617***
.98
-.203***
-.275***
3.18***
(.111)
(.144)
(.015)
(.017)
Older Black Female
-.412*
-.651**
.89
-.235***
-.301***
.194
(.160)
(.215)
(.023)
(.025)
Older Hispanic
-.277
.201
-1.39
-.004
.180***
-4.48***
Female
(.236)
(.251)
(.028)
(.030)
Constant
-2.028***
-1.474***
.374***
.298***
(.107)
(.118)
(.016)
(.017)
* p <.05; ** p <.01; *** p <.001
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Table 6.1 Intercept-Only Models for District Effects.
In/Out Decision
All
PrePostCases
Booker Booker
Intercept
.564***
.589***
.595***
(.044)
(.047)
(.051)
Residual
* p <.05; ** p <.01; *** p <.001
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Sentence Length
All
PrePostCases
Booker Booker
.132***
.134***
.143***
(.010)
(.010)
(.011)
.693***
.707***
.669***
(.001)
(.001)
(.001)

Table 6.2 Multi-Level Regression Models for District-Level Variables.
In/Out Decision
Sentencing Length
Model 1 Model 2 Model
Model 4
Model
Model
3
5
6
Political Variables
Percent Voting Republican
-.008
.003*
(.007)
(.002)
Republican Governor
-.037
-.012
(.112)
(.024)
Percent Voting
-.012
-.005*
(.011)
(.002)
Border District
.245
.018
(.153)
(.034)
Community Variables
Percent Black
-.003
-.001
(.007)
(.001)
Immigrant Concentration
.134
-.026
(.078)
(.015)
Disadvantage Index
.169*
.023
(.070)
(.015)
White/Black Income
.059
.021
Inequality
(.210)
(.044)
White/Hispanic Income
-.429
-.145**
Inequality
(.258)
(.055)
Female Labor Force
6.800
-.213
Participation
(3.485)
(.735)
Administrative Variables
District-Mean Offense
Severity
District-Mean Criminal
History Score
Percent Violent Cases
Percent Drug Cases
Caseload (ln)
Control Variables
Violent Crime Rate (ln)
Intercept

.019*
(.008)
.004
(.051)
-.016*
(.007)
-.001
(.002)
.012
(.017)

-.010
(.037)
.176
(.240)
-.008
(.034)
.010
(.008)
.129
(.078)
-.186***
(.048)
.473***
(.040)

-.154**
(.059)
.457***
(.039)

Residual

-.155**
(.055)
.474***
(.040)

-.033**
(.010)
.106***
(.008)
.694***
(.001)

-.026*
(.012)
.099***
(.008)
.694***
(.001)

-.054***
(.012)
.104***
(.008)
.694***
(.001)

* p <.05; ** p <.01; *** p <.001
NOTE: Analysis also controls for all Level-1 Variables (not shown)
NOTE: In/Out Decision is modeled using logistic mixed model regression, while Sentence Length is
modeled using linear mixed models.
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Table 6.3 Comparison of Pre- and Post-Booker Multi-Level Regression Results for Political
Variables.
In/Out Decision
Sentence Length
Pre-Booker Post-Booker
ZPre-Booker Post-Booker
Z(N=398,780) (N=275,602) Score (N=398,780) (N=275,602) Score
Variable
Percent
-.003
-.016
1.15
.003
.004*
-.35
Republican
(.008)
(.008)
(.002)
(.002)
Republican
-.038
-.031
-.03
-.006
-.020
.38
Governor
(.120)
(.128)
(.025)
(.027)
Percent Voting
-.007
-.024
.96
-.006*
-.004
-.47
(.012)
(.013)
(.003)
(.003)
Border District
.242
.231
.05
.021
.013
.16
(.163)
(.172)
(.035)
(.037)
Violent Crime
-.173**
-.204***
-.035**
-.031**
Rate
(.051)
(.054)
(.011)
(.012)
Intercept
.500***
.516***
.109***
.116***
(.043)
(.048)
(.009)
(.009)
***
Residual
.710
.667***
(.001)
(.001)
* p <.05; ** p <.01; *** p <.001
NOTE: Analysis also controls for all Level-1 Variables (not shown)
NOTE: In/Out Decision is modeled using logistic mixed model regression, while Sentence
Length is modeled using linear mixed models.
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Table 6.4. Comparison of Pre- and Post-Booker Multi-Level Regression Results for
Community Variables.
In/Out Decision
Sentence Length
Pre-Booker Post-Booker
ZPre-Booker Post-Booker
Z(N=398,780) (N=275,602) Score (N=398,780) (N=275,602) Score
Variable
Percent Black
-.006
.001
-.66
-.001
-.001
.00
(.007)
(.008)
(.001)
(.002)
Immigrant
.114
.179*
-.61
-.024
-.031
.32
Concentration
(.072)
(.079)
(.015)
(.016)
Disadvantage
.189*
.150
.36
.020
.030
-.44
Index
(.073)
(.081)
(.015)
(.017)
White/Black
.136
-.135
.82
.020
.026
-.09
Income Inequality
(.22)
(.248)
(.045)
(.050)
White/Hispanic
-.442
-.341
-.27
-.153**
-.124*
-.35
Income Inequality
(.272)
(.248)
(.056)
(.062)
Female Labor
6.904
6.458
.08
-.379
.142
-.46
Force Participation
(3.673)
(4.117)
(.757)
(.834)
Intercept
.476***
.510***
.102***
.112***
(.042)
(.059)
(.008)
(.009)
Residual
.710***
.667***
(.001)
(.001)

* p <.05; ** p <.01; *** p <.001
NOTE: Analysis also controls for all Level-1 Variables (not shown)
NOTE: In/Out Decision is modeled using logistic mixed model regression, while Sentence Length is
modeled using linear mixed models.
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Table 6.5 Comparison of Pre- and Post-Booker Multi-Level Regression Results for
Administrative Variables.
In/Out Decision
Sentence Length
Pre-Booker Post-Booker
ZPre-Booker Post-Booker
(N=398,780) (N=275,602) Score (N=398,780) (N=275,602)
Variable
District-Mean
-.007
-.016
.16
.019*
.018*
Offense
(.039)
(.043)
(.008)
(.009)
Severity
District-Mean
.198
.125
.19
-.014
.035
Criminal
(.253)
(.281)
(.053)
(.057)
History
Percent Violent
-.003
-.010
.13
-.018*
-.014
Offenses
(.036)
(.039)
(.008)
(.008)
Percent Drug
.009
.013
-.31
-.002
-.002
Offenses
(.009)
(.009)
(.002)
(.002)
Total Cases (ln)
.150
.096
.43
.011
.013
(.083)
(.093)
(.012)
(.019)
Violent Crime
-.165**
-.126*
-.055***
-.054***
Rate (ln)
(.058)
(.064)
(.012)
(.013)
Intercept
.496***
.534***
.107***
.116***
(.043)
(.050)
(.009)
(.009)
Residual
.710***
.667***
(.001)
(.001)
* p <.05; ** p <.01; *** p <.001
NOTE: Analysis also controls for all Level-1 Variables (not shown)
NOTE: In/Out Decision is modeled using logistic mixed model regression, while Sentence
Length is modeled using linear mixed models.
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ZScore
.08

-.63

-.35
.00
-.89

Table 7.1 Multi-Level Regression Models for Cross-Level Interactions.
In/Out Decision
Sentence Length
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3 Model 4
Model 5 Model 6
Level-1 Variables
Black
.184***
.182***
.784*
.183***
.027***
-.094**
(.026)
(.028)
(.307)
(.017)
(.003)
(.031)
Hispanic
.406***
.410***
.471
.023
.042***
-.233***
(.032)
(.032)
(.263)
(.015)
(.003)
(.025)
Female
-.241***
-.240***
(.023)
(.003)
Level-2 Variables
Percent Republican
-.010***
.004***
(.007)
(.002)
Percent Black
.004
.001
(.011)
(.002)
Immigrant
.101
-.027*
Concentration
(.066)
(.014)
Female Labor
.023
-.009
Force Participation
(.019)
(.004)
Caseload (ln)
.147
-.002
(.079)
(.017)
Political Variables
Black x Percent
-.009**
-.003***
Republican
(.003)
(.0003)
Hispanic x Percent
.021***
.0004
Republican
(.003)
(.0003)
Community
Variables
Black x Percent
.001
.001***
Black
(.002)
(.0002)
Hispanic x
-.039*
.008***
Immigrant
(.018)
(.002)
Concentration
Female x Female
040***
-.007***
Labor Force
(.008)
(.001)
Participation
Administrative
Variables
Black x Caseload
-.067
.014***
(.034)
(.003)
Hispanic x
-.008
.030***
Caseload
(.028)
(.003)
Intercept
.477***
.457***
.474***
.106***
.098**
.103***
(.041)
(.039)
(.040)
(.008)
(.008)
(.008)
Residual
.694***
.694***
.694***
(.001)
(.001)
(.001)
* p <.05; ** p <.01; *** p <.001
NOTE: Analysis also controls for all Level-1 Variables (not shown)
NOTE: In/Out Decision is modeled using logistic mixed model regression, while Sentence Length is
modeled using linear mixed models.

120

Table 7.2 Comparison of Pre- and Post-Booker Multi-Level Regression Results for Political
Cross-Level Interactions.
In/Out Decision
Sentence Length
Pre-Booker Post-Booker
ZPre-Booker Post-Booker
Z(N=398,780) (N=275,602) Score (N=398,780) (N=275,602) Score
Level-1
Variables
Black
.193***
.182***
.021***
.052***
(.032)
(.049)
(.004)
(.004)
***
***
***
Hispanic
.352
.496
.032
.067**
(.039)
(.041)
(.004)
(.005)
Level-2
Variables
Percent
-.004
-.020*
.003*
.005**
Republican
(.008)
(.009)
(.002)
(.002)
Interaction
Terms
Black x Percent
-.010**
-.008
-.30
-.003***
-.003***
.00
Republican
(.003)
(.006)
(.0004)
(.0005)
Hispanic x
.020***
.022***
-.31
.0003
-.0002
1.00
Percent
(.004)
(.005)
(.0003)
(.0004)
Republican
Intercept
.503***
.518***
.109***
.116***
(.004)
(.048)
(.009)
(.009)
Residual
.710***
.667***
(.001)
(.001)
* p <.05; ** p <.01; *** p <.001
NOTE: Analysis also controls for all Level-1 Variables (not shown)
NOTE: In/Out Decision is modeled using logistic mixed model regression, while Sentence
Length is modeled using linear mixed models.
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Table 7.3. Comparison of Pre- and Post-Booker Multi-Level Regression Results for Community Cross-Level
Interactions.
In/Out Decision
Sentence Length
Pre-Booker
Post-Booker
Z-Score
Pre-Booker
Post-Booker
Z-Score
(N=398,780)
(N=275,602)
(N=398,780)
(N=275,602)
Level-1 Variables
Black
.184**
.184**
.018***
.045***
(.033)
(.052)
(.004)
(.005)
Hispanic
.334***
.502***
.029***
.067***
(.040)
(.056)
(.004)
(.005)
Level-2 Variables
Percent Black
-.007
.021
-.001
-.001
(.007)
(.013)
(.002)
(.003)
Immigrant
.106
.187*
-.024
-.036*
Concentration
(.072)
(.076)
(.014)
(.015)
Female Labor
-.028
-.026
-.009*
-.008
Force Participation
(.020)
(.023)
(.004)
(.005)
Interaction Terms
Black x Percent
.002
-.001
.67
.001**
.002***
-2.77**
Black
(.002)
(.004)
(.0003)
(.0003)
Hispanic x
.023
-.117***
3.16***
.010
.009***
.27
Immigrant
(.030)
(.033)
(.002)
(.003)
Concentration
Female x Female
042***
.032*
.63
-.007***
-.006***
-.44
Labor Force
(.009)
(.013)
(.001)
(.002)
Participation
Intercept
.484***
.529***
.101***
.110***
(.042)
(.050)
(.008)
(.009)
Residual
.710***
.667***
(.001)
(.001)
* p <.05; ** p <.01; *** p <.001
NOTE: Analysis also controls for all Level-1 Variables (not shown)
NOTE: In/Out Decision is modeled using logistic mixed model regression, while Sentence Length is
modeled using linear mixed models.
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Table 7.4 Comparison of Pre- and Post-Booker Multi-Level Regression Results for
Administrative Cross-Level Interactions.
In/Out Decision
Sentence Length
Pre-Booker Post-Booker
ZPre-Booker Post-Booker
(N=398,780) (N=275,602) Score (N=398,780) (N=275,602)

Level-1
Variables
Black
Hispanic
Level-2
Variables
Caseload (ln)
Interaction
Terms
Black x
Caseload
Hispanic x
Caseload
Intercept

.525
(.370)
-.371
(.329)

1.584**
(.558)
1.678***
(.457)

-.073
(.039)
-.301***
(.033)

-.147**
(.050)
-.166***
(.039)

.138
(.084)

.176
(.097)

-.003
(.017)

-.003
(.019)

-.037
(.041)
.075*
(.035)
.493***
(.043)

-.158*
(.063)
-.127**
(.049)
.541***
(.050)

.010*
(.004)
.035***
(.003)
.106***
(.008)
.709***
(.001)

.022***
(.006)
.025***
(.004)
.115***
(.009)
.667***
(.001)

1.61
3.35***

Residual
* p <.05; ** p <.01; *** p <.001

NOTE: Analysis also controls for all Level-1 Variables (not shown)
NOTE: In/Out Decision is modeled using logistic mixed model regression, while Sentence Length is
modeled using linear mixed models.
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ZScore

-1.66
2.00*

FIGURES
Figure 7.1. Interaction between Black Offender and Percent Voting Republican.
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Figure 7.2. Interaction between Hispanic Offender and Percent Voting Republican.
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Figure 7.3. Interaction between Black Offender and Percent Black.
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Figure 7.4. Interaction between Hispanic Offender and Immigrant Concentration.
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Figure 7.5. Interaction between Female Offenders and Female Labor Force
Participation.

Sentence Length (Odds-Ratio)

0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4

Female

0.3

Male

0.2
0.1
0
10

30

50

70

Female Labor Force Participation

128

90

Figure 7.6. Interaction between Black Offenders and Caseload.
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Figure 7.7. Interaction between Hispanic offenders and Caseload.
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